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 Abstract 
Europeanization as a crucial insrument for democrtatization process in target 
countries requires gradual complaince with EU membership conditions where 
conditional positive incentives (ultimately EU membership) in return are offered 
as rewards to acceding countries. Provoked by conflicts at domestic level, the 
current setbacks in Europeanization proceses of several countries (here is Turkey 
and Serbia), however, put a query on the effectiveness of conditionality strategy. 
This thesis seeks to answer a highly related question to this debate :Does 
candidate status matters? And to what extent it matters?  
Unpacking the relationship between Europeanization and conditinality, I argue 
that it is less the candidate/membeship status per se that matters but rather the 
unfavourable domestic factors, high costs of compliance, existence of domestic 
veto players and, the failure of the countries to include the civil society actors in 
the transformation process, that account for the limited impact of transformative 
power of EU and for low level of compliance in Turkey and Serbia. The empirical 
analysis of two cases reveals that credible accession conditionality is only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition of EU success in promoting reform 
process. In order to be effective it has to be accompanied by favourable domestic 
conditions. As a conclusion, this thesis points out that European actors must take 
into account of the cultural filters of target countries and loopholes in the 
Europeanization process and recognize that “one size does not fit all”  but rather 
domestic factors matter.  
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 1 Introduction 
At the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999, Turkey was 
given formal status of candidate country. This put counrty’s general project of 
Westernization into a different and more concrete context and resulted in an 
intensification of reform process in the country. (Eralp, 2006:52). Following the 
Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, Serbia was granted potential 
candidate country status (proto-candidate) for EU accession which triggered a 
comperehensive refom process in the country. I will label these EU-guided reform 
processes as Europeanization. As a relatively new and exiting way of looking at 
domestic change, Europeanization is generally used with regard to ‘the domestic 
impact of the EU’ (Sedelmeier 2006: 4) and thus constitutes a crucial concept for 
analyzing the Union's transformative power where conditionality is very much at 
the centre. 
 
However, as it has become obvious with the current backsets in 
Europeanization process in both countries, the EU leverage has been ineffective 
alone to ensure sustainable compliance when European values, norms and rules 
meet with political contestation and resistance in the national arena. Within this 
perspective favourable domestic factors, pro-reformist change agents and indirect 
diffusion mechanisms such as socialization have gained immense importance to 
achieve sustainable compliancy process and internalization of norms. Addressing 
the apparent role of cultural filters of the countries which mitigate the 
transformative impact of European norm diffusion and political learning in the 
country, this thesis argues that case of Turkey and Serbia can be considered as a 
litmus test for the success of transforative power of conditionality and role of 
external incentives in achieving eventual Europeanization. 
1.1 Research Question and Purpose  
The purpose of this disseration is to examine the ‘limits of conditionality’ with 
a particular emphasis on Europeanization process in Turkey and Serbia where the 
accession negotiations with the former were suspended in 8 chapters of acquis in 
2006 and the association negotiations with the latter has fallen into abeyance 
between May 2006 and June 2007 due to conflicts at national level. While EU 
conditionality can have important catalytic role in prompting reforms, a 
sustainable reform process also requires certain domestic conditions to prevail.  
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 By comparing Turkey as a negotiating candidate country and Serbia as a part 
of Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) which is a special version of the 
EU’s enlargement policy, the thesis thereby asks if candidate status matters – and 
to what extent  it matters. It argues that the comparison between the two group of 
countries within different institutional framework of EU (countries with/without a 
candidate status), is not only relevant for the research question and critical for the 
hypotheses being tested; but also is a considerably underdeveloped research area 
in the current literature which made this question a ripe for analysis.  
1.1.1 Hyptohesis and Main Argument 
 
Starting from a Europeanization perspective and taking a middle-ground 
between rationalist and sociological (constructivist) institutionalism, the thesis 
focuses on the hypothesis that it is less the candidate status per se that matters but 
rather the unfavourable domestic factors, high costs of compliance, existence of 
robust veto players and the failure of the countries to include the civil society 
actors in their transformation process that account for the limited impact of 
transformative power of EU through conditionality and for low level of 
compliance. In particular when the political costs of compliance are high for 
target goverments, that is when fulfilling EU conditions becomes a challenge for 
traditional notions of  the regime, for the secuirty and integrity of the state, and/or 
the interests of goverment, it becomes difficult for government and political elites 
too attach to ultimate goal of EU membership and to resist against veto players 
who have a vested interest in protecting the status quo.  
 
Even credible membership/candidacy incentives therefore prove to be 
ineffective where favourable domestic factors and pro-reformist change agents 
can promote further reforms. Considering the current situation, Brussels should 
face the weak facades of its enlargement strategy based conditionality. This puts 
eventual success of Europeanization in question and reveals the limits of it as a 
top-down and elite-driven project (Öniş, 2009a :22). 
 
1.1.2 Sub-questions and Contribution 
The question if candidate status matters is at the same time closely related to 
the second part of the question – namely to what extent it matters. It is impossible 
to evaluate the impact of EU candidate status if we cannot explain the facilitating 
and constraining domestic factors which have impact on both. Therefore, some 
sub-questions have to be considered:  
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   Sub-questions 
 
? In what ways does EU leverage most affect target countries; and, what domestic
factors most complicate its impact? 
? Is conditionality seen essentially as a means to an end, that is, achieving
membership; or, is there also some element of commitment to this by accession
states?  
? How important is the credible prospect of EU membership? 
? What is needed for longer-term effectiveness of political conditionality?   
 
The second part of the question mainly is related to impact of domestic factors 
on the EU candidate status. Internal characteristics have brought about different 
dynamics in the Europeanization process which still have to be fully researched. 
So far they have usually been cited in the Europeanization literature as important 
variables, but they are still mostly treated as ‘a black box’ or have only been 
partially revealed (Fink-Hafner, 2008:167). By focusing on endogenous factors in 
this thesis I seek to contribute to closing the mentioned gap in research. 
 
Another contribution of this thesis to the literature is to analyze the impact and 
implementation of the EU's transformative power in relation to domestic factors in 
a comparative case study of Turkey and Serbia where the former is a negotiating 
candidate country and the latter is a part of SAP. While there is a general 
necessity to widen research on SAP-Europeanization, it can be also observed that 
the ‘Europeanization and enlargement’ literature has so far mainly focused on 
CEE accession (cf. Sedelmeier 2006: 6). It follows from this that there is an 
urgent need to analyze in more detail democratization and Europeanization 
processes in SAP countries and more recent candidate countries such as Turkey 
that have different insitutional ties with of EU . 
.2 Research Design, Case Selection and Methods  
 1.2.1 Research Design and Approach 
The research design is a ‘comparative case study’ which is equipped with a 
strong theoretical background and an extensive empirical analysis. This type of 
comparison has also been referred to as 'case-oriented’ since country is unit of 
analysis and the aim is to test hypotheses for differences or similarities between 
countries in order to generate a deeper understanding of a topic (Landman, 
2008:28). By comparing two cases that are not share similar features but have a 
common political outcome (Most Different Systems Design –MDSD) allows 
researcher to distill out the common elements from diverse countries that have 
3
 greater explanatory power for outcome. This system is based on Mill’s method of 
agreement which seeks to identify those features that are same among different 
countries in an effort to account for a particular outcome (ibid:70) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Method of agreement and difference 
 
Based on  J.S Mill’ (1843) method of agreement and difference, the method of 
comparing few countries can be divided into two types of system design: Most 
Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD).MSSD 
seeks to identify the features that are different among similar countries and which 
account for the different political outcome, while MDSD compares countries that are 
not share similar features but have a common political outcome (Landman 2008:28). 
 
 
Case study method, as an empirical inquiry, provides a much more rich and 
accurate description and explanation of the phenomenon in question, and thus also 
contributes to theory-testing in the social sciences. In general the thesis is 
designed as a theory-testing case study to assess the conditions of effective 
incentives and learning, and to determine which of them are necessary and/or 
sufficient for complaince and political change or in other words Europeanization 
in target countries-Turkey and Serbia. The main difficulty in theory testing 
method is that tests are partly dependent on the causal assumptions of theories 
themselves. That is, the cases are chosen biased that they support and fit the 
theory. However since the set of variables strong enough to predict the outcome of 
cases (high probability) and they are more important in accounting the outcome; 
thus the theory will not be forced into predictions beyond its scope (Landman, 
2008:37; Evera, 1997:34).  
 
This research employs a traditional linear approach which follows a 
hypothetico-deductive strategy. This forms a linear process where specific 
hypotheses are derived from existing theory, with data then collected and tested in 
relation to those hypotheses (Babbie et al 2007: 9, Flick 2006: 98-102) Focusing 
on domestic factors as the intervening variables in explaning the (non-) 
compliance with demands of EU I will derive hypotheses from external incentives 
and social learning models. 
 
 
 
Dependent-Indpependent Variables 
 
The thesis tests hypotheses –structured as independent variables- of the social learning 
model and the external incentives model (size and credibility of rewards and legitimacy, 
domestic adoption costs, veto players, idenitifaction, domestic resonance) to examine the 
conditions under which political elites in Turkey and Serbia have complied, or partially 
complied or rejected to comply with the political demands of EU- dependent variable-.  
 
 
 4
 The independent variables are subdivided into external and domestic 
conditions and organized as a simple model which exemplifies the impact of 
interaction between external incentives and domestic conditionson 
Europeanization patterns of countries (Putnam’s two level game).  For each case  
a similar basic template is used which begins with initial conflict and different 
issues of norm violation in target country, and then turns to European demands 
and conditions. The analysis finalizes with the outcome part where the 
compliancy patterns of countries are analysed in different temporal stages.  
         1.2.2 Case Selection  
Testing of hypotheses relates directly to the question of generalizability and 
this in turn relates to the question of case selection. Here generalizability of case 
study results can be increased by the strategic selection of cases. Case selection 
therefore is an integral part of a good research strategy to achieve well-defined 
objectives of the study. Hence the primary criteria for case selection is whether it 
has relevance to the research objective of the study-here to theory testing purposes 
and provides rich opportunities for improving understanding of the primary 
phenomena or processes under research (Yin, 2003:34).  
 
Since the purpose of this thesis to examine the ‘scope and limitations of 
conditionality’ with a particular emphasis on Europeanization process, 'hard cases' 
(Turkey and Serbia) are selected in which democratic conditionality and its effects 
are more easily observable than in 'easy cases’. “We will be able to learn more 
about the conditions of its effectiveness and ineffectiveness since the challenge to 
conditionality is higher in cases of significant conflict (Schimmelfening et 
al.2003:501). Thus these two coutries can be regarded a critical cases which can 
be defined as having strategic importance in relation to the general problem 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006:229). Moreover they are also selected in accordance with MDSD 
which compares countries that are not share similar features but have a common 
political outcome. Turkey and Serbia are different in many terms (see p.11) 
however both face with challenges on the road to EU membership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Selected cases: Turkey and Serbia  
 
Turkey and Serbia are selected as case studies which are difficult cases concerning the
conflict between European political norms and state behavior due to varying set of
factors. Recent events corroborate the strains and fictions: The accession negotiations
with Turkey were partially suspended in December 2006; and the association
negotiations with Serbia were frozen between May 2006 and June 2007 due to
conflicting domestic factors. Consequently these two countries are critical cases to
understand why Europeanization mechanism does not work properly when it meets
with conflict and resistance at national arena.  
5
 1.2.3 Methodological Considerations and Data Collection 
 
In order to measure the level of adaptation to democratic conditions of EU as 
the dependent variable, the Freedoms House's guidelines are commonly used by a 
wide range of scholars for analyzing the progress of democratic change. However 
considering current problems in the Europeanization process in Turkey and 
Serbia, I found out that the problems are not related to democratic institutions, 
political rights, or civil liberties, therefore the Freedoms House ratings of both 
countries did not change within the selected time frames and even during the 
critical junctures. In particular, when Europeanization process became a challenge 
and negotiation process was partially stalled in Turkey in 2006 and, in Serbia 
between 2006 and 2007, the ratings remained the same.1 The recent problems can 
not be totally explained then by the general analysis of Freedoms House's 
guidelines, therefore I primarily focused on analysis of official EU documents.  
 
The core of the emprical research consists the analysis of official documents 
(Regular reports, Accession Partnership Documents and National Programmes for 
Adoption of Acquis for Turkey and SAP feasibility reports for Serbia, Reports 
from the Commission and DG Enlargement) and daily news services which 
allows to keep close track the demands of EU and reactions of target goverments. 
In addition to primary (official documents, speeches, press releases etc.) sources, 
the analysis relies on the rich collection of secondary sources (academic 
literature). 
 
 In order to gain a better understanding on the issue, semi-standardized expert 
interviews with scholars working on Europeanization in South Eastern Europe 
(specifically on Turkey and in Serbia) are chosen to be conducted.2 Semi-
standardized interview developed by Scheele and Groeben (2001) as a specific 
elaboration of semi- structured interviews, combines a highly structured agenda 
with the flexibility to ask subsequent questions (Flick, 2006:155-56) . 
 
In the interviews, interview guides are used, as Flick argues ‘are partially 
structured by a written interview guide which mentions several topics’ (Flick, 
2006:156). A guide for semi- standardized interview ensures that interview does 
not get lost in topics that are of no relevance and permits the expert to 
extemporize his or her issue and view on matters (Meuser and Nagel, 2002:77). 
The questions (open-ended and hypotheses-directed) are ideally constructed some 
time before the interview and are sent to the experts so they can start to prepare 
responses3.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 See Appendix A- Freedom House Guidelines and Ratings 
2  See Appendix B -List of Interviewees and Interview Guide 
3 See Appendix B -List of Interviewees and Interview Guide 
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 I complement the analysis of conditions and compliance with a process-
tracing analysis through examing the histories, offical documents, interview 
transcripts, and others sources to “trace the links between possible causes and 
observed outcomes” (George and Bennett, 2005:6). Process tracing is an 
indispensable tool of theory-testing. The process tracing method attempts to 
identify the intervening caual chain between an independent variable (or 
vairables) and outcome of dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005:206). It 
allows analyzing the effect of different independent variables and the effect of 
variance in the independent variables across cases (ibid: 75-81). Taken together 
these methods ensure to better assess what really mater for compliance and non-
compliance patterns of target countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What really matters... 
 
The thesis, proposes that it is less the size of reward (membership/candidate status) per se 
that matters but rather the low level of domestic resonance, high costs of compliance, 
absence of European indetification, existence of powerful veto players and failure of the 
domestic actors to include the civil society level to promote societal Europeanization 
process and to promote internalization of this externally driven trasformation process that 
account for the limited impact of transformative power of EU and for low level of 
sustainable compliance in selected cases.  
 
1.2.4 Limits of Comparative Analysis 
There are some limitations of this comparative analysis. Firstly 
Europeanization is still an ongoing process and a moving target in both cases so it 
is early to analyse the process. Secondly the case studies and comparative analysis 
covers short-term elite responses to European demands where the decisions of 
political leaders in power that matter most for the compliance patterns with EU 
requirements of the countries. However domestic actors outside government such 
as interest groups, big business communit, NGOs and other civil society 
organizations have also crucial role in Europeanization process Therefore no 
complete picture of the Europeanization process in each country can be made. 
 
Thirdly, Turkey and Serbia have different historical backgrounds whereas the 
former has a long tradition of parliamentarian democracy and the latter has been 
an illiberal regime which was dominated by a nationalist and/or authoritarian 
leadership under Milošević, until 2000. It is very recent that Serbia has become a 
nation state of modern European type with international legal personality.  
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Some History... 
 
From 2003 to 2006, Serbia has been part of the "State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro." This union was the successor to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SRJ). Following the referendum in Montenegro in 2006, the National Assembly of 
Serbia declared the "Republic of Serbia." However Turkey, in spite of its inherent 
limitations and frequent, though short-lived interruptions, is a democratic, secular, 
unitary, constitutional republic whose political system was established in 1923 under 
the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the 
aftermath of World War I. 
 
 
Yet another issue that makes a comparison between Serbia and Turkey 
somewhat problematic concerns the differences in the Europeanization 
experiences of the two countries. Turkey’s relations with Europe dates back to 
1950s. Turkey has been treated as a credible candidate since the 1980s. At the 
Helsinki Summit of the European Council in 1999 offered Turkey concrete 
prospect of full membership, more than four decades after its application for 
association with the European Economic Community in 1959. This put general 
project of Westernization into a different and more concrete context of 
Europeanization Thus, a strong identification with Europe has been and is a core 
feature of modern Turkey. 
 
Europeanization process, however, is still at the very beginning in Serbia 
whereby new leaders announced that Serbia would seek to join the EU with the 
fall of Milošević in 2000. Serbia was granted potential candidate country status 
(proto-candidate) for EU accession following the Thessaloniki European Council 
of June 2003 after which EU has become undoubtedly a significant factor shaping 
the transition to democracy in general and an important factor driving change in 
the counrty (Ladrech, 2008:149).  
 
It should be noted that the differences between these two cases are also 
advantageous for an enriched comparative analysis.Since the main question of this 
thesis is whether candidate status matters, it is relevant to compare Turkey and 
Serbia where the former is holding a candidacy status since 1999 while latter is 
not since it is a proto-candidate since 2003. Moreover the variation among two 
countries in the independent variables provides rich opportunities for 
understanding of the processes under research. 
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 1.3 Literature Rewiew 
There is a growing literature dealing with the EU's transformative power or, in 
other words, Europeanization in South-Eastern European countries such as 
Croatia, Serbia and Turkey and Bulgaria and Romania. However  the literatue 
dealing with the political (democratic) facets of Europeanization and the 
compliance problems in countries is recently emerging (Anastasakis and Bechev 
2003, Emerson et al, 2005, Grabbe, 2003, Noutcheva, 2006 Schimmelfenning 
2008, Schimmelfenning et al 2006, Subotic, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
More on Literature... 
 
This area of study recently emerged as a developing research field with the compliance 
problems especially in South-Eastern European countries due to incomaptible domestic 
factors and high level of adoption cost for goverment. Recent events confirm the strains 
and frictions: the start of accession negotiations with Croatia was postponed for half a 
year in 2005, the accession negotiations with Turkey were partially suspended in 
December 2006; and the association negotiations with Serbia were frozen between May 
2006 and June 2007. EU conditions such as cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ICTY at The Hague and between the ethnic groups in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the future status of Kosovo, and Turkey’s recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus are related to issues of national identity that put potentially high 
political costs of compliance on the target governments and have been responsible for the 
recent problems where Europeanisation is paralysed. In case of Romania and Bulgaria, 
both countries have problems to comply with EU requirements due to domestic factors 
such as powerful veto players, difficulty of political mentality or elite culture which is still 
significantly influenced by the past regime, low level of civil mobilization (Noutcheva 
and Bechev, 2008; Pridham 2007; Demetropoulou, 2002). 
 
While the transformative impact of Europe on domestic politics in Turkey and 
in Western Balkan countries including Serbia, attracted widespread interest within 
academic literature, the present lack of comparative analysis on the EU`s 
influence Turkey and Serbia can be considered as a research deficit and a blind 
spot in current Europeanization research; and a topic ripe for analysis. 
  
The transformative impact of the EU on Turkish politics has generated a large 
body of literature with most attention having been directed at assessing the impact 
of the EU on democratization in post–2002 era (e.g.Öniş 2003, Aydın and 
Keyman 2004, Tocci 2005, Baç 2005, Kubicek 2005). There is a growing body of 
literature concerning the contradictory nature of Europeanization process where 
its transformative power startd to challenge the established notions of regime 
(Kemalism, civil-military relations and identity politics), interests of goverment 
(Verney and Ifantis, 2009, Hughes, 2004, Grigoriadis, 2008, Joseph 2007, Heper, 
2005, Glyptis, 2005, Kirişçi 2007, Öniş and Keyman, 2007, Öniş 2006 ) and on 
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 positions of political actors (Öniş 2009, Onar 2007, Dağı 2005, Özbudun, 2006, 
Yavuz, 2006).  
 
For the case of  Serbia, there are several studies analysing the impact of the 
EU framework; through the prospect of future membership, EU active mediation 
through conditionality and socialization, and challenges of the process (Noutcheva 
and Huysseune, 2004, Noutcheva 2006, Cierco, 2009  Subotic 2009, Jelincinc et 
al. 2006, Anastakis, 2005). However as Subotic (2009) argues that Serbia (with 
Albania, Moldova) as the the most reluctant Europeanizer and the most 
challenging case for Europeanization still remains persistently understudied and 
undertheorized in the Europeanization literature. Subotic presents three alternative 
arguments for EU’s low impact in hard cases: weak endogenous demand for 
Europeanization (abssence of European idea), veto players institutionalized in 
democratic structures (power of old regime spoilers) and competing elite 
preferences about Europe. She tests her theoretical framework to explain the 
stalled process of Europeanization in Serbia. 
 
There are also some studies cover comparative studies of South Eastern 
European countries  (see e.g. Engert 2004; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 
2006, 2003 Baracani  2006, Noutcheva 2006, 2007) Noutcheva (2007:2) argues 
that the EU’s policy of conditionality vis-à-vis three Western Balkan cases-Serbia 
and Montenegro during 2002–06, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and 
Kosovo -has been based on strategic interests rather than normative considerations 
or moral concerns. Moreover the domestic actors in the three cases have tried to 
challenge the normative grounds of the EU’s policy and have responded with fake 
compliance, partial compliance and non-compliance. She demonstrates that the 
legitimacy of the EU’s demands as perceived by domestic political actors is key 
for explaining the divergent compliance responses of the Western Balkan 
countries.  
 
Starting from the two most prominent models in the literature on international 
norm promotion–the social learning model and the external incentives model 
Schimmelfennig et al. (2006) use Qualitative Comparative Analysis to examine 
the domestic and external conditions under which governments in eastern Europe 
have complied with the political demands of EU and to assess the conditions of 
effective incentives and learning, and to determine which of them were necessary 
and/or sufficient for political change.However it does not explain how and why 
those changes come about or not. I aim to fill this gap by explaining the reasons 
behind different Europeanization outcomes in Turkey and Serbia 
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  1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
The structure of this thesis is as follows. After the introductory chapter which 
broadly covers the research question(s), main argument and hypotheses, research 
design, metholodology and an overview of the existing literature, next chapter 
(Chapter 2) presents conceptualisation and theoretical framework for 
Europeanization. Chapter 3 describes the main hypotheses and the variables as a 
model to be tested for the selected cases in the following chapter. Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 introduce the empirical findings of the study where the conditions and 
compliance patterns are evaluated for each case, respectively for Turkey and 
Serbia. Chapter 6 makes comparative analysis of the cases in relation to the 
prescribed model and the research question whereas chapter 7 summarizes the 
findings with a speial focus on importance of negleted factors and points out 
avenues for future research. 
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 2. Europeanization  
Europeanization has become one of the most widely used theoretical 
approaches for studying the EU and its influence on the current and future EU 
member states which has emerged as an ‘academically developing industry’ 
(Olsen, 2002:921). There is a burgeoning literature on conceptualizing the term 
and identifying how this process might shape a country’s internal politics.  
 
As is the case with so many concepts in political science, Europeanization 
refers to a number of related phenomena and thus is much like ‘the proverbial 
elephant’ as named by Ishiyama (2006:5); it means many different things to many 
different scholars.4 Although there is a lively debate over the concrete definition 
of Europeanization (see Cowles et al, 2001, Radaelli and Featherstone 2003, 
Olsen, 2002, Risse and Börzel, 2003 Grabbe 2001), the term is generally used 
with regard to “the domestic impact of the EU” (Sedelmeier 2006: 4) and thus 
constitutes a crucial concept for analyzing the Union's transformative power 
through diffusion of ideas namely rules, values and norms (Börzel and Risse, 
2008)  
 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
The literature in Europeanization studies has historically focused on bottom-
up perpespective analyzing the impact of its transformative power on the 
countries that have already joined the EU (Cowles et al. 2000; Radaelli 2000, 
Goetz and Hix, 2001). Caporaso et al. have used Europeanization to describe the 
‘emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is of political, legal, and social institutions associated with 
political problem-solving which formalizes interactions among the actors, and of 
policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules” (Cowles et al, 
2001:3) 
 
Within this context, Europeanization affects nation state, political culture and 
domestic policies but also informal structures such as business-government 
relations, public discourses, and nation state identities and collective 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 See Appendix C, Box 1-Europeanization 
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 understanding of citizenship norms. Thus, it is clear that Europeanization changes 
structure of nation states and the collective understandings attached to them 
(Cowles et al, 2001:236). 
 
However a perception of the “Europeanization process as being self-contained 
and limited only to the EU’s member states may be misleading since 
Europeanization can also be exported, especially towards the candidate countries” 
(Papadimitriou, 2002:5). EU exerts similar pressure on the applicant countries 
whereby its transformative power has catalyzed fundamental democratic and 
economic reforms and change through conditionality in Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEEC) (Grabbe 2004, Goetz 2005, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005, Vachudova, 2005, Pridham 2005). This thesis therefore has a 
post-ontological approach which focused on the post-ontological state of 
Europeanization theory. 
 
 
 
 
Post-Ontological Approach towards Europeanization 
 
In post-ontological approach it is assumed that there is a process of European 
integration under way, but that the focus in research should not be on the nature of the 
beast-why Europeanization is taking place. Instead Europeanization, as a research 
agenda is all about bringing domestic politics back into our understanding of 
European integration, is all about how the EU matters, focusing on the impact of 
Europeanization on domestic political and societal processes (Radaelli 2004:2-3). 
Within this sense the thesis has a top-down perspective of Europeanization where the 
lines between European and national are more clearly drawn for the transformative 
impact of the EU on target countries. It gives a more comprehensive picture for 
analysing the processes between the European and national levels (Börzel and Risse 
2003:57). 
         2.1.1 Europeanization: An Instrument for Democratisation 
 
More recently the literature concerning the transition and democratisaton 
especially in CEECs, makes extensive use of the concept of “Europeanization” 
which becomes an important instrument and mechanism for top-down 
democratisation process of countries in the enlargement track.  Conditionality is a 
concept that is placed very much at the centre of the Europeanization. EU 
democratic conditionality is based on rule transfer and generally works through 
‘reinforcement by reward where membership is the greatest reward to be offered’ 
(see Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2004). The Copenhagen 
criteria of 1993 draw the main framework of candidate countries’ Europeanization 
along the EU accesion process. It puts emphasis on ‘stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, 
protection of minorities’. 
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 Recently, the EU, as a gravity model of democratisation (Emerson and 
Noutcheva 2004), is furthering development of democracy, namely 
Europeanization via the mechanism of political conditionality in Turkey and in 
Western Balkans creating new opportunity strucures but also leading to challenges 
and paradoxes for these countries.  
 
The Turkish, Croatian and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian 
(FYROM) candidacy and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in the 
Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia 
and Kosovo) provide researchers with intriguing opportunities for scrutinying the 
effects of transformative power of EU on promoting democracy and facilitate 
legislative, institutional and normative changes in a diverse group of countries. 
These studies thus started to broaden the focus of Europeanization and establish 
the Europeanization of applicant states as a separate sub-field of this broader 
research agenda. 
         2.1.2 Europeanization: Just ‘Formal’ Rule Transfer or More? 
 
Within the framework of this thesis, I will be attached to Radaelli's definition 
to Europeanization which is broad enough to cover political structure, public 
policy, identities and the cognitive dimension of politics. Radaelli argues that this 
can be applied both to the EU member states and other countries. Thus, “the 
concept of Europeanization, as it stands now, is supposed to explain processes of 
cultural change, new identities’ formation, policy change, administrative 
innovation and even modernization” (Radaelli 2000:4-5): 
 
 
 
 
Radaelli’s definition or Europeanization: 
 
“Europeanization consists of processes of ; 
a) construction, 
b) diffusion and  
c) institutionalisation  
of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing 
things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU
policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational)
discourse, political structures and public policies.” (Radaelli, 2000:4) 
 
 
 
 
There are two reasons why I have prefered to be adhered to Radaelli’s 
definition within the framework of this thesis. Firstly, Radaelli's definition 
attributes the different types of change what Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2005) define as formal change (the legal transposition of rules) and behavioural 
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 change (implementation, application and enforcement). Thus this definition 
presents an opportunity to analyze Europeanization not only as hard transfer of 
rules, procedures and policy paradigms but also as soft transfer of styles, ways of 
doing things, shared beliefs, norms and discourses. As a second reasoninig, since 
the focus of this definition is on the adaptive response by actors to a changed 
and/or changing environment, it presents an opportunity to systematically analyze 
the compliance patterns of political elites and other actors as the agents of change, 
once the Europeanization has been gradually incorporated in the rationale of 
behaviour, policies, discourses and agendas of these actors. 
 
 
 
 
Change agents  
 
Change agents are sometimes called “norm entrepreneurs” in the domestic system. 
These change agents can be NGOs, universities, the media, political parties, 
professional associations (lawyers, doctors, and business people) but also state 
bureaucracies and politicians. They engage with similar organizations and people in 
the EU and form “transnational networks” and “epistemic communities” through 
which social-learning occurs.They try to influence the government try to influence the 
government. (Aydın and Çarkoğlu, 2006:73) 
 
I understand Europeanization, therefore, as a process much broader than 
political change through “EU rule transfer”. The European impact actually goes 
beyond policy dimension and spill-over patterns of democratic legitimization. 
Europenization encompasses the penetration of EU rules, norms and values into 
different domestic speheres where it has normative transformative impact on 
ideological structures and preferences of the target states. This expansive concept 
of Europeanization is the starting assumption of this thesis. I argue that 
investigating the deeper normative impact of the EU on states and societies would 
provide for a more complex picture of how and to what extent the EU matters, 
and/or if it matters at all. After outlining the Europeanization conceptual 
delimitations, the thesis turns to theorizing Europeanization process through 
elaborating its main areas of influence, scope and mechanisms. 
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 2.2 Theorizing Europeanization 
Taking the Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization as the main point of 
departure, now I aim to have a deeper understanding of this heuristic concept by 
raising the several questions- “what is Europeanized to what extent and how (or 
not) ? 
         2.2.1 Domains of Europeanization 
The question ‘what is Europeanized?’ refers to domains of Europeanization -
that is, the area where the effects of Europeanization are supposed to materialize. 
Radaelli (2000:7-14) argues that there are two main areas where Europeanization 
has fundemental impact; i) domestic structures (political structures of 
representation and cleavages, cognitive and normative structures) and, ii) public 
policy. Börzel and Risse (2003: 60-1) use distinction between policies, politics 
and polity to identify three dimensions along which the domestic impact of 
Europeanization can be analysed and processes of domestic change can be traced. 
Policies refers to standarts, instruments, problem-solving mechanims, policy 
narratives and dicsourse ; politics includes processes of interest formation, interest 
aggregation, interest representation and public discourse; whereas polity attributes 
political institutions, intergovermental relations, judical structues, public 
administration, state traditions, economic institutions, state-society relations and 
collective identites.  
 
Figure 1 Dimensions of Domestic Change: Polity, Policy, and Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Börzel, Tanja (2003) How the EU interacts with its member states, Riehe 
Politikwissenschaft, Political Science Series, 93, p.4 
 
It is important to demonstrate the domains of Europeanization which are all 
partly nested with each other, to manifest the wide range of EU influence on 
target countries. It is actually not only about legal engineering through adoption of 
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 EU laws, regulations and rules but also about change of ways of doing things, 
norms and collective understandings. 
2.2.2 Scope of Europeanizaion: “…to what extent?” 
The scope of domestic change in response to EU’s transformative power 
through diffusion of its values, norms and rules differs is related to how much 
change’ has been brought about by Europeanization. Domestic change in response 
to Europeanization (that is, extension and direction of Europeanization or 
outcome of Europeanization) pressures can be weak or strong.  
 
The literature broadly distinguishes between five different outcomes regarding 
the scope or degree of change; inertia, absorption, accomodation, transformation 
and retrenchment. (Radaelli 2000; Cowles et al 2001, Risse and Börzel, 2003, 
Börzel 2003). Taken together, they cover both the magnitude of change and its 
direction. On each of these levels the effect of diffusion processes can range from 
more or less domestic change to large scale transformation. (See Figure 2 below). 
 
 
Figure 2 Scope of domestic change in response to Europeanization 
 
 
Source: Börzel, Tanja (2003) How the EU interacts with its member states, Riehe 
Politikwissenschaft, Political Science Series, 93, p.16 
 
 
To begin with, inertia refers to ‘a situation of lack of change’ which can take 
forms of lags, delays in the transposition of EU rules and in implementation, and 
abrupt resistance to compliance with EU requirements (Radaelli, 2000: 14). From 
a constructivist perspective high adaptational pressure is likely to meet inertia, 
inhibiting any domestic change. In contrast, a rationalist approach would see high 
adaptational pressure as likely to result in transformation within the target country 
(Börzel, 2003:17). The reason behind the inertia can be the inconsistency between 
EU political architectures, choices, models or policy and domestic practices. In 
the long-term, however, inertia can not be sustained economically and politically 
since it would produce crisis.  
 
Absorption is accommodation of policy requirements without real 
modification of the essential structures and changes in the ‘logic’ of political 
behavior (Héritier 1998 : 21). Thus the degree of change is low. It can be said that 
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 it is just legal adaptation or in other words formal change through ‘hard transfer’ 
of EU rules without changing the core. 
 
Accomodation should not be confused with transformation where the former 
refers to modest level of change and the latter to high level of change. Receving 
countries accommodate European pressure by adapting existing processes, 
policies and institutions without changing core features and the underlying 
collective understandings attached to them (Knill 2001). 
 
Transformation occurs when existing policies, processes, and institutions are 
changed by new, considerably different ones, or altered existing ones to the extent 
that their core features and/or the underlying collective understandings are 
fundamentally changed (Börzel, 2003:16). The degree of domestic change is high, 
affecting the core of system-wide political, economic and social structures and the 
political culture of a country (Cowles, et al, 2001: 15). 
 
However, as stated by Radaelli (2000:11) Europeanization can also induce 
retrenchment which can be an example of ‘negative’ Europeanization. This is a 
very paradoxical effect, as it implies that national policy becomes less ‘European’ 
than it was. 
 
The expected consequence of EU’s transformative power through diffusion of 
its values, norms and rules is to promote transfortmation and compliance. 
However this is not a process free of conflict, resistance, and politics (Börzel and 
Risse, 2008:2). Consequently, as the Europeanization literature suggests, the 
influence of transformative power of EU on receiving counries depends on 
domestic configurations. Thus the process is conceptualized as “domestic 
adaptation with national colors” in which national features continue to play a role 
in shaping affect the direction and extension of diffusion of European ideas 
(Cowles et al.2001:1-3).  
2.2.3 How countries Europeanized?  
 
Europeanization literature has offered interesting insights into the mechanisms 
of EU influence on the domestic structures of target countries (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2005; Grabbe 2004; Kelley, 2004; Vachudova, 2005). The literature 
has identified several mechanisms through which Europe can make the target 
states to comply with its requirements.  
 
Knill and Lehmkuhl distinguish between institutional compliance, where the 
EU prescribes a particular model which is ‘imposed’ on the receving states, 
changing domestic opportunity structures, which leads to a redistribution of 
resources between domestic actors, and policy framing, which alters the beliefs of 
domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999) Börzel (2003) and the contributors to 
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 Green Cowles et al. (2000) have drawn attention to the so-called ‘goodness of fit’ 
(in plain English, the degree of institutional compatibility) between domestic 
institutions and European policy. By focusing on the ‘goodness of fit’, these 
authors draw our attention to explanatory-mediating- factors (facilitating formal 
institutions, veto players, change agents and political culture) related to any 
mechanism of change (See Figure 3). They argue that the domestic structural 
change under the process of Europeanization can be perceived as a “three-step” 
approach. The three steps;  Europeanization, goodness of fit and mediating factors 
altogether affect the outcome of domestic structural change. 
 
            Figure 3 Europeanization, Mediating Factors and Domestc Change  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Goodness of 
misfit 
Domestic 
change 
Mediating 
institutions 
and factors 
Europeanization 
process 
 
1.Multiple veto players 
2.Facilitating formal institutions 
3.Political culture 
4.Differential empowerment of 
actors 
5.Social learning 
 
 
Cowles, Risse ve Caporaso “Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction”, M. 
Cowles, T. Risse and J. Caporaso (eds.) Europeanization and Domestic Change: Transforming 
Europe, Cornell Universirty Press, Ithaca,: London , 2001, p.6 
 
The different causal mechanisms of domestic change can be grouped around 
two theoretical approaches that draw on different strands of neo-institutionalist 
reasoning: Rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The 
former refers to interest-based whereas the latter refers to norm-based motives 
driving governments’ compliance (Börzel and Risse 2003, Börzel 2003). 
Rationalist institutionalists suggest that ‘logic of consequentiality’ (instrumental 
rationality or rational choice) is the main factor influencing the EU’s impact on 
domestic change.  
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 As Sedelmeier (2006:10) points out, the pressure of the EU for adaptation 
changes the opportunity structure of domestic actors. Whereas the EU offers 
material rewards in case of compliance with its interests, national elites follow 
such conditionality according to a cost-benefit calculation. This logic primarily 
relies on an interest-driven argument, according to which domestic reforms are 
implemented in order to pursue interests that are created or supported by this new 
opportunity structure (Sedelmeier 2006: 10). Socialization approaches in contrast 
to the rationalist ‘logic of consequentialism’ with a constructivist ‘logic of 
appropriateness’(or normative rationality) (March and Olsen 1998). From this 
perspective, EU is more than a political opportunity structure. It entails new rules, 
norms, practices, and structures of meaning, which the target states have to 
incorporate. Domestic actors are socialized into European norms and rules of 
appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine 
their interests and identities accordingly. (Checkel 1999).  
 
To sum up, the different causal mechanisms of domestic change give rise to 
distinct expectations when and how actors seek to promote ideas and decide to 
adopt them, respectively. 
 
2.3 Explanatory Models of Europeanization 
Within the framework of this thesis I follow Schimmelfenning et al. (2006) 
approach and employ two basic models for European governance and rule 
promotion–external incentives and social learning- to understand the motives 
behind the compliance decisions of target states. 
2.3.1 External Incentives Model 
The external incentives model which is a rationalist bargaining model focuses 
on the size and speed of rewards, credibility of conditionality as well as domestic 
veto players and domestic costs of adaptation. Accordingly the external incentives 
model mainly follows governance by conditionality in which the EU sets its rules 
as conditions that the target states have to fulfill in order to receive EU rewards 
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir, 2004: 661-679). The starting point of external 
incentives model is the misfit between between European and domestic processes, 
policies and institution (goodness of fit) which puts adaptational pressure on states 
(Cowles et al. 2001, Börzel and Risse, 2000). The model assumes that the EU 
conditionality challenges domestic status quo by providing incentives for rule 
adoption and changes the domestic opportunity structure (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005:11). 
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 Given the asymmetrical interdependence (Vachudova, 2006:9), the model 
allows EU to use the threat of exclusion from the next stage of process on 
candidate countries  that are not fulfilling the required reforms and reward states 
in response to progress in complying with the conditions, implementing reforms 
and adapting EU laws.  The most general proposition of the external incentives 
model of conditionality and Europeanization is therefore that “ a state comply 
with the norms of the EU if the benefits of the rewards exceed the domestic 
adoption costs and level of credibility of incentive is high” (Schimmelfennig, 
2005:4). This cost-benefit balance depends on the size and credibility of 
international rewards, on the one hand, and the size of domestic adoption costs, on 
the other.  
2.3.2 Social Learning Model 
In contrast, the social learning model emphasizes the legitimacy and domestic 
resonance of the norms, and the identity and cognitive priors of the target actors. 
The main hypothesis based on the social learning model is that “the likelihood of 
compliance increase with the legitimacy and resonance of the norms and the 
identification of the target state with the EU” (Schimmelfennig, 2005:7). This is 
known as the “domestic salience” (Linden ed. 2002) or the “resonance” 
hypothesis of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (ed. 2005: 20).  
 
This is also argued by Checkel (1999:83-114) who maintains that the success 
of norm diffusion in a certain domestic context depends on the “degree of cultural 
match” between international norms and domestic practices. Thus it should be 
also noted that actors are more open to social learning and persuasion when the 
norms and values of EU have some resonance with pre-existing norms, values and 
practices in the target country. So the domestic politics -in particular, institutional 
and historical contexts- delimit the causal role of persuasion/social learning and 
national compliance with European ideas, thus helping both rationalists and 
constructivists to redefine their borders within they can influence compliance 
process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
“Both/and” perspective 
 
In order to move from an "either/or," "gladiator" style of analysis to a "both/and
perspective (Checkel, 2001:581) and to prevent the possibility to fall into the “'norms
versus interest’ trap of theorizing” (Börzel and Risse 2007: 3), Checkel puts
emphasis on interaction between these two appropaches through of logic of arguing
which is based on the role of argumentative persuasion and social learning . 21
 3. Modelling Europeanization: Set of 
Conditions for (non-)Compliance  
Research into member states’ compliance with EU has become a large and 
thriving subfield in EU studies,  which has resulted in a fairly long list of factors 
that plausibly affect compliance in the EU but it still remains somewhat 
inconclusive with regard to the factors that explain the causes of failure in 
compliance.5 However, even in absence of generally accepted explanation of 
causes of non-copmlaince, it is possible to use hypotheses of Schimmelfennig et 
al. (2006)  for compliance in opposite way for non-compliance. For the empirical 
analysis, I would concretise Europeanization into a model of analysis, albeit in 
inherently different ways, based Schimmelfennig et al.’s hypotheses. 
 
       3.1 Main Hypotheses and Variables  
The main hypothesis based on the external incentive model is that ; ‘a state 
resist to comply with the norms of the EU if the domestic adoption costs exceed 
the benefits of the rewards and level of credibility of incentive is low’. The 
external incentive model  proposes two factors which have impact on resistance to 
comply with EU requirements in target countries: credible incentives and costs. 
 
The main hypothesis based on the social learning model is that; ‘a state resist 
to comply with the norms of the EU if the level of perceived legitimacy and 
resonance of the norms and the identification of the target state with the EU is 
low’. The social learning model, then puts forward three factors which may 
explain different Europeanization outcomes in target countries: legitimacy, 
identity and resonance. 
 
The dependent variable of the study is (target state) compliance with the 
demands of EU. To discriminate between compliance and non-compliance, the 
main indicator is legal rule adoption. “A state is considered to be in compliance if 
it has signed a treaty and/or passed a law on the basis of the norm promoted by 
EU”(Schimmelfennig et al 2006: 58). Focusing on external and domestic factors 
as the intervening/independent variables in explaining the (non-) compliance at 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 See Appendix C, Box 2-Failure in Compliance 
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 EU level I will benefit from the hypotheses of external incentives and social 
learning models to examine the limit the effectiveness of political conditionality. 
For general analytical purposes I argue that states find it challenging to comply 
with EU requirements and resist change due to set of factors (independent 
variables)  
 
The domestic independent variables are imporant to illustrate that the 
complaince decision is not only about legal rule adoption but also soft transfer of 
styles, ways of doing things, shared beliefs, norms and discourses.  
3.2 Two Level Game: External-Domestic Factors  
The independent variables will be subdivided into external and domestic 
conditions. In this respect, Robert Putnam (1998)’s two-level game framework is 
illustrative where the interplay between external and domestic level complicate 
the complaice pattersn and limit the effectiveness of political conditionality in 
target countries  
 
The external conditins refer to attribute of EU’s strategies (size and credibility 
of rewards and legitimay); whereas domestic conditions attributes of target 
goverment (costs, veto players idenitifaction, resonance): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External factors  
 
i) The size and credibility of EU 
rewards  
ii) Legitimacy of EU arguments  
 
 
3.3 The conceptualisation o
3.3.1 Size and Credibility of EU rew
  
The first source of variation under a s
size and credibility of the conditional re
 2Domestic Factors  
 
i) The domestic compliance costs  
ii) The existence of veto players in
domestic structures  
iii) The identification with EU 
iv) The domestic resonance  f variables 
ards 
trategy of reinforcement by reward is the 
wards. The target countries are offered 
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 material or other tangible political rewards in return for compliance -such as 
financial assistance, market access, and technical expertise- nevertheless 
institutional tie is the most powerful political instrument for enforcing compliance 
which starts with trade and cooperation agreements,  is followed by association 
agreements whereas full membership is the strongest institutional tie and the 
greatest reward to be offered (Schimmelfennig, et al 2003:496-7). 
 
Given a strategy of reinforcement by reward, effective external governance as 
argued by Schimmelfennig (2008:921) has to be credible in two ways. Firstly, it 
requires certainity where target states are rewarded with significant steps toward 
accession in response to progress in complying with the EU`s political conditions 
and adapting EU laws. Secondly they shoud be aware of that they would be 
excluded from EU membership if they do not fulfill the required reforms. Grabbe 
(2001:1020) calls this part of process ‘gate keeping’ as EU determines when each 
candidate can progress to the next stage towards accession. Within this context the 
distance of the membership perspective or in other words likelihood that rewards 
will be delivered in the forseeable future also affect the effectiveness of 
conditionality and have impact on compliance (Schimmelfennig et al, 2002:11) 
3.3.2 Perceived Legitimacy of EU conditions  
The main hypothesis postulates that the level of perceived legitimacy of EU 
condition matter for effectiveness of the conditionality. When conditions are 
based on rules, which are consensually shared among the Member States, clearly 
defined, and coherently applied in the EU, their level of legitimacy and thus the 
pull effect for compliance is high and they are difficult to manipulate by the target 
governments. By contrast, ‘double standards’ would result in low level of trust in 
EU and fail to exert the same compliance pull (Schimmelfennig, 2006 :50). 
3.3.3. Domestic Adoption Costs   
The likelihood of adoption decreases with  net domestic adoption costs 
(political or power costs of governments) from compliance to EU requirements. 
Political actors in the target countries calculate whether the rewards offered by EU 
are worth the costs of adaptation. The size of domestic adoption costs, in this 
sense, determines whether they will accept or reject the conditions. When the 
political costs of compliance are high for the target government, that is, when 
fulfilling EU conditions threatens the security or integrity of the state, or the 
survival of the regime or the government’s domestic power base, and its core 
political practices for power preservation, even credible membership incentives 
turns out to be ineffective (Schimmelfennig, 2008:921) Moreover when short term 
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 costs of reform are so great it may create a majority of voters opposing it and this 
lead to failure in complaince.6 
 
Vachudova shows that, although EU began to implement the conditionality of 
the pre-accession process, it had little success in changing domestic policies in 
illiberal democracies in Western Balkans where ‘governments turned their backs 
on the benefits of EU membership to protect their power, autonomy and rent-
seeking opportunities’(Vachudova, 2006:2). 
3.3.4 Veto players /Elite competition 
According to veto players theory, ‘the difficulty for a significant change of the 
status quo . . . increases in general with the number of veto players and with their 
distances’ (Tsebelis 2002: 37). Compliance to EU requirements, therefore 
becomes a challenge if there is a high number of veto players (political elites, 
military and judiciary actors, bureaucrats etc.) who are institutionalized in 
domestic structures with vested interest in protecting the old normative order and 
control the apparatus of force (the military, police, or intelligence agencies) that 
sustain it. Thus, when Europeanization threatens the interetst of these forces, limit 
their autonomy or alter their place, the costs of compliance will be too high, and 
Europeanization would stall. 
 
The painful and costly transformation in pre-accession period provides 
greatest opportunities for veto players and creates a vacuum in which they benefit 
by adopting anti-EU position through populist politics (Schrijvers 2007:41, Lewis 
2008:156). The existence of powerful veto players and competing elite 
preferences/strategies about Europe therefore directly shape Europeanization 
outcomes (Subotic, forthcoming). 
3.3.5 Identification with EU  
Identification with EU refers to that the target government regards as its 
relevant “in-group” and that it aspires to belong to. Non-member states are more 
likely to be persuaded by EU if they identify themselves with the state and society 
of  EU community (Checkel 2001: 563) The main hypothesis is that the stronger 
the identification of a government with “Europe”, the more likely conditionality 
will be effective. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 J-curve hypothesis developed by Adam Przeworski, see Appendix C Box-2  
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 3.3.6 Domestic Resonance  
States are more likely to be persuaded by EU if European norms and values 
have resonance with pre-existing domestic norms, values and practices in the 
target country and if ‘the European idea’ is a constitutive part of a candidate 
state’s political identity (whether state describes itself and its state as “Western” 
and/or “European”). This is known as the “domestic salience” (Linden et al. 2002) 
or the “resonance” hypothesis Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 20). Thus it 
should be noted that actors are more open to social learning and persuasion when 
the norms and values of EU have some resonance with pre-existing norms, values 
and practices in the target country—what Checkel  (1999:83-114) terms as 
"cultural match”. Similarly, Risse accounts for the differential Europeanization of 
nation-state identities in the EU with the varying degree of resonance of 
Europeanization with domestic political visions and understandings of Europe 
(Risse, 2001).  
 
3.4 A model for Interactive Analysis 
Figure 1 (see below) presents a simple model which illustrates the impact of 
interaction between external incentives and domestic conditions on 
Europeanization patterns of countries. The external conditions refer to attribute of 
EU’s strategies (size and credibility of rewards and legitimay); whereas domestic 
conditions attributes of target goverments (costs, veto players idenitifaction, 
resonance). Before explaining the model it should be noted that the model is based 
on the pre-assumption that compliance is a process driven by elites where the 
decisions of political leaders in power that matter most for the compliance 
patterns with EU requirements of the countries. However domestic actors outside 
government such as interest groups, big business communites,  NGOs and other 
civil society organizations have also crucial role in shaping Europeanization 
process. They can act as change agents can put pressure on goverments and force 
political elites for further European reforms. 
 
(1) Positive Europeanization: If endogenous factors are favourable and 
external incentive is strong, this powerful push-pull impact will lead to positive 
Europeanization where the level of compliance to EU requirements is on its 
highest level. Referring to scope of domestic change in response to 
Europeanization, the outcome can be evaluated as transformation where the 
degree of domestic change is high, affecting informal and formal structures of 
countries (see p.17)  
 
(2) Slowed but ongoing Europeanization: Europeanization loses its impetus 
but still contiunes on a lower rank through pushing power of favuroable domestic 
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 factors and /or demand of change agents who put pressure on governent for 
further reforms although external incentive is weak  
 
 
Figure 4   Modelling Europeanization Patterns 
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tial/fake Eurpeanization: Europeanization process moves further by 
olitical actors who simulate compliance to avoid the even higher costs 
ation, total refusal to comply and denial of a membership prospect if 
ctors are unfavourable. In this sense even credible external incentives 
ective. Noutcheva argues that “fake/shallow compliance is cheaper 
ompliance because the costs of non-compliance are higher than the 
ulating EU compliant change in the short run while seeking ways of 
hat change and maximizing profits in the long run”. In this case 
ctors pass legislations to meet with EU requirements but implication 
llow up due to lack of political will to do the reforms demanded. 
actors do not believe in the appropriateness of these domestic changes 
, 2006:17-21). Thus the degree of change is low (level of absorption) 
y requirements are accommodated without changes in the ‘logic’ of 
havior (see p.12). 
lled Europeanization: When unfavourable domestic conditions are 
with weak external incentives, the outcome can be characterized as 
opeanization where the reform process paralysed and faced with a 
is can take forms of lags, delays in the transposition of EU rules and in 
tion, and abrupt resistance to compliance with EU requirements what 
rtia (see p.12). 
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Negative Europeanization-retrenchment 
 
If the domestic political elites question the legitimacy of EU norms and painful and costly
transformation process connected to Europeanization, they tend to oppose further
integration with EU which paved the way for negative Europeanization. In context of
rising nationalism and populism the political elites concentrate on identity politics and
issues of nationality in order to justify their EU-reluctance and mobilize frustrated voters
(see p.12)  
 
The constellation of domestic factors can vary from one country to another. To 
ain explanatory adequacy about interaction between domestic and external level 
he descriptive studies have to be complemented with carefully conducted in-
epth case studies which offer both theoretical rigor and empirical process tracing. 
y focusing on the two level game where internal characteristics have brought 
bout different dynamics in the Europeanization process in two countires- Turkey 
nd Serbia- this thesis aims to unpack the relationship between conditionality and 
uropeanization and to understand the reasons behind different Europenization 
atterns in these countries. 
.5 Litmus Test for the Model of Europeanization: 
urkey and Serbia 
Turkey and Serbia with plethora of challanges to Europeanization process are 
elected as case studies to test the above mentioned hypotheses. Both countries 
ifficult cases concerning the conflict between European political norms and 
ational legacies and state behavior. EU decided to freeze accession negotiations 
n 8 chapters of acquis with Turkey in December 2006; and the association 
egotiations with Serbia between May 2006 and June 2007 due to issues related 
ith countries’ identity politics and national legacies.  
 
The cases illustrate the cultural filters which mitigate or constrain the 
ransformative impact of European norm diffusion and political learning in the 
ountry leading to unexpected consequences such as resistance and rejection of 
orms.  
 
 
Cultural Filter 
 
The cultural filter is “based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge 
and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion “ 
 
Ian Manners (2002:245)  
28
 The interplay turned out to be negative in in these countries once adaptation to 
the 
 
he problem with Europeanization of Turkey and Serbia therefore do not rest 
onl
EU requirements have become a challenge to historical legacies, political 
culture and national identity and thus the political costs of compliance turned out 
to be too high and veto players embedded in the domestic sociopolitical context 
gained more power through nationalist and populist strategies. 
 
T
y on formal compliance to EU requirements. The greatest challenges will be to 
abandon practises of past so become behaviorally Europeanized (Jano, 2008:67) 
Therefore recent developments in these countries put the limits of conditionality 
in achieving national compliance and the success of eventual Europeanization in a 
litmus test. The analysis begins with Turkey then turns to Serbia and finalizes 
with a comparative review. 
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 4. Turkey: The Train Crashed or 
Continues to Move? 
‘Turkey did not rise phonenix-like out the ashes of Ottomon Empire. It was ‘made’ in 
the image of Kemalist elite’. 
                                                                                                        Feroz Ahmad 
 
 
Turkey (in contrast to Serbia) has never been a dictatorial regime but has a 
long tradition of liberal parliamentarian democracy. Addressing its Kemalist 
ideology and ‘reform-averse’ political culture, Turkey exemplifies a unique and 
challenging test with regard to resonance of European norms (Uğur and Yankaya, 
2008:581)  
 
The Europeanization process in all areas of policy in Turkey as Ulusoy 
(2005a: 22) puts it very well ‘is much more profound than the framework of 
democratic conditionality thereby it is actually not only about changing laws, 
regulations but rather goes to the core of the political structure’. This paved the 
pay to mental transformation and transvaluation whereby the normative core of 
political activity, its defining values and all features of mainstream Turkish 
political culture face the need to radically change. 
 
4.1 Conflict and NormViolation: Kemalist Paradox 
Kemalism is the state doctrine that defines the basic characteristics of the 
Republic of Turkey and, has two core principles: secularism (the strict separation 
of religion and state) and nationalism reflecting a single Turkish identity (ethno-
cultural homogenity and territorial unity) (Posch, 2007:10; Patton, 2007:341). It 
was formulated by the Turkish national movement and its leader Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk with the eventual aim of reaching contemporary level of civilization since 
Turkish state elites consider themselves as Western. Therefore achieving EU 
membership is regarded as the zenith of the Kemalist model of modernization and 
realization of Ataturk’s long lasting dream for the country (Öniş, 2006:4).  
 
Turkey’s identification with Europe has been a product of this Kemalist 
project. However as the EU has increasingly moved into normative nucleus of 
Turkish state through imposing Copenhagen criteria, the EU membership started 
to shake Turkey’s self-definition as a European state and all features of Kemalist 
political culture what makes Turkish case a ‘trial for Europeanization (Kubicek, 
1999:157; Grigoriadis, 2009). Kemalist elites in bureaucracy, military and 
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 judiciary therefore have become the main veto players against the EU reform 
process (Patton, 2007:349). Anti-EU Kemalist elites are anxious about the process 
would undermine the Kemalist ideology and also their power and priviliges. The 
Kemalist paradox and robust veto players put potentially high political costs of 
compliance on government and caused slowdown in the reform process in the 
country. Stated by Grigoriadis, “the veto players in the bureaucracy are still 
powerful in the country, This has become obvious with the decision of 
Constitutional Court annuling the amendments that would have opened the way 
for women to wear a headscarf in uıniversities which can be interpreted a step 
back of the reform process, towards negative Europeanization” 7 
 
The question in the case of Kemalism is: is that possible? Can Kemalism be 
streamlined in a way that makes it fully compatible with EU membership 
requirements which are virtually of a revolutionary character,? As Glyptis 
correctly puts it, ‘the biggest challenge facing Turkey is not measured in terms of 
its ability to meet EU criteria but in terms of its willingness to change the 
normative content of Turkish politics’ (2005:401). Within the framework of this 
thesis, Kurdish question, insufficient democratic-civilian control of military and 
Cyprus problem are taken as examples illustrating contradictory nature of Turkish 
policy practises and its Kemalist ideology for EU’s notions of liberal democracy.  
 
4.2 Kemalist Nomenclature: Kurdish Question, Role 
of Military and Cyprus Deadlock 
As Feroz Ahmad noted ‘Turkey did not rise phonenix-like out the ashes of 
Ottomon Empire. It was ‘made’ in the image of Kemalist elite which won the 
national struggle against foreign invaders and old regime’ (1993:2). The top-down 
Kemalist model of modernization could not, however, transform itself into 
democratic consolidation8 and failed to stimulate cultural modernization which 
has manifested itself more explicitly with the European integration process in 
forma of identity-based demands for cultural recognition (cf. Kurdish question), 
increased democratic control of military and more liberal approach towards 
Cyprus conflict challenging the strictly secularist and state controlled nature of 
Kemalist ideology  (Keyman and Öniş, 2007:11-17).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 Author’s interview with Ioannis N. Grigoriadis , 27 March 2009 , EUI-Florence, Italy 
8 Democratic consolidation offered by Juan J. Linz, who calls it a state of affairs "in which none of 
the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there 
is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and . . . no political institution or group 
has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers. . . . To put it simply, 
democracy must be seen as the `only game in town.' (adopted from O'Donnell 1996 ) 
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 4.2.1 Kurdish Question  
Turkey’s Kemalist conceptualization of national identity which emphasizes 
the homogenity, unity and indivisibility of state, its people and its territory leveas 
no room for recognition of ethic minorities. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 which 
was signed as the consequence of the Turkish War of Independence between the 
Allies of World War I and Turkey, acknowledges religious, non-Muslim groups 
as minorities (Greek and Armenian Orthodoxs and Jews) enjoying the same civil 
and political rights as Moslems (Lundgren and Oktav, 2009:4-5). Thus 
recognizing minorities other than these groups (cf. Kurdish) is not only about 
changing laws through legal engineering but changing definition and the very 
nature of Turkish state.  
 
The Kurds represents Turkey’s largest ethnic,cultural and lingusitic minority 
of about 12-13 million people, around four to five million of whom live in 
provinces of south-east Anatolia (Ergil, 2000:125, Karimova and Deverell, 
2001:13). However Kurdish question is not only about ethno-Kurdish nationalism 
in form of identity politics claiming for recognition of difference but also and 
more devastatingly about low intensity war between goverment and the terrorist-
guerrilla organisation that PKK -Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (the Kurdish Worker 
Party)  (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997:227) . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PKK and Kurdish Question 
 
The PKK is a militant organization which was established in 1970s. The original aim 
of the organization, though changed during time, is to establish a Kurdish state in the 
borders of Turkey, Iran Syria, and Iraq. The organization used terrorism against both 
civilians and military targets since that time. Therefore, it is listed as a terrorist 
organization by a number of states. Recently, the PKK has softened its original aim 
which is to acquire cultural and political rights for the Kurds in Turkey (Tocci, 
2008:877). 
 
 
 
The demands for the recognition of Kurdish identity due to its links to PKK 
were perceived as threats to the territorial integrity of the state and met with harsh 
reactions by the traditional establishment. In sum Turkish policy towards Kurdish 
problem came into sharp conflict with European human rights and standarts 
requiring respect for and, protection of minorities. 
4.2.2 Old Soldiers Never Die  
Another principle of Turkish political culture is traditionally defined role of 
military, more precisely the Turkish Armed Forces-TAF (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri-
TSK) in politics. The military actors with secularist elites were traditional 
architectures of westernization project in Turkey where they were entitled as 
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 guardian of secular republican regime by the 1961 Constitution. In the post-1960 
period TAF took power into own hands several times (coup d'état in 1960, 1971, 
1980, and military memorandum in 1997). Besides direct influence, military has 
had indirect influence over politics through the National Security Council-NSC 
(Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Security Council-NSC 
 
NSC has been the main tool of military to influence domestic politics. NSC is widely 
perceived as the institutional form of the Turkish military’s influence over politics (Heper, 
2005:35). Until very recently the NSC was responsible for preserving a very broadly 
defined concept of internal and external national security. The composition of NSC has 
been de facto dominated by military actors who were supposed to meet every month and 
‘the government had to give top priority to the recommendations made by the NSC’ 
(Aydın and Keyman, 2004: 35-6). In addition, the military enjoyed considerable 
autonomy regarding defence budgeting and defence procurement which is linked to its 
influence on political decision-making (Cizre, 2004:122) and State Security Courts which 
were not independent of military control and have dealt with cases involving crimes 
against the security of the state 
 
 
The military actors are uncomfortable with EU-induced reforms since the 
process became challenging for indivisible integrity and the secular character of 
the state which are two fundamental values of military. In the eyes of military 
elites, EU membership process would weaken state through curbing military 
power and opening state to the threaths of Islamist resurgence and Kurdish 
seperatism (Aydın and Çarkoğlu, 2006:53; Patton, 2008:346). The traditionally 
tailored role of TAF in politics is, therefore, contradictory to the structure of civil-
military relations defined in European countries. However should be noted that 
the military still remains by far the most trusted institution in society (Karaveli, 
2008:5) 
4.2.3 Cyprus Deadlock  
The last example is Cyprus conflict whose roots date back to the early 
twentieth century.9 In the Kemalist establishment, the ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) has traditionally been regarded as an indispensable part 
of the Turkish motherland since 1974 when the Turkish military intervened and 
took control of the northern part of the island. On 15 November 1983, the Turkish 
Cypriots declared the establishment of the TRNC as a sovereign independent 
State. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 See Appendix C, Box 6; for a historical overview of Cyprus conflict. 
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 This unilateral declaration of independence has failed to achieve international 
recognition but with the sole exception of Turkey and as a result the TRNC has 
been economically dependent on Turkey (which has also kept a military force 
there). In the south, the Greek Cypriots retained the title of “Republic of Cyprus” 
(RoC) viewed by the international community, with the exception of Turkey, as 
the only legitimate authority on the island despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots 
in state institutions (Baracani, 2007:14-6). 
 
The Cyprus dispute reached a deadlock when Turkey issued a Declaration on 
Cyprus stating that its signature in the EU Summit in December 2004—where the 
decision to open the accession negotiations with Turkey was also taken—to 
extend its Customs Union with the EU to all new member states (including 
Cyprus) does not constitute recognition of the divided island’ (Ulusoy, 2008: 318) 
which is unacceptable by EU. Besides its practical concerns Cyprus issue also 
carries “a symbolic value for Turkey. In the Kemalist establishment, the ‘Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus’ has traditionally been regarded as an key security 
issue for the Turkish ‘motherland’. Thus, recognition of the Republic of Cyprus is 
related to issues of national identity (Schimmelfennig, 2008:919-20). This is aldo 
underlined by Grigoriadis “The Cyprus issue has become an issue of national 
pride and the symbolic domestic cost of a compromise seems to something 
prohibitive”10 
 
4.3 European Demands and Conditions 
The size and credibility of rewards and rule legitimacy can be regarded as high 
for the issues of Kurdish question and insufficient democratic-civilian control of 
military; but the legitmiacy is comparatively low for Cyprus problem 
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2006:98-9)  
 
With regard to Kurdish rights, EU has codified respect for and protection of 
minority rights as norm in community’s treaties and put it as a condition to 
become an EU member in Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Thus it is 
clearly defined, consensually shared among all the Member States, and coherently 
applied in the EU. In addition EU put respet for minority rights, cultural rights and 
protection of minorities as one of the priorities in its Accession Partnership 
Documents (APD) with Turkey in 2001 and repeated it in 2003, 2006, 2008. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10 Author’s interview with Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, 27 March 2009, EUI-Florence, Italy 
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What EU asks for... 
 
Ankara should “ensure cultural diversity, guarantee cultural rights for all citizens 
irrespective of their origin and  promote respect for and protection of minorities in 
accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), improve effective 
access to radio and TV broadcasting in languages other than Turkish [.....] to enhance 
economic, social and cultural opportunities for all Turkish citizens, including those of 
Kurdish origin”   
 
European Council (2008) Accession Partnership Document with the Republic of Turkey, 
Brussels, 18 February 2008 (2008/157/EC), p.6    
 
Civilian and democratic control of military is not included in official accession 
criteria of Copenhagen or in acquis. Nonetheless the rule legitimacy can still be 
considered as high since it is the norm unanimously shared in all member states 
(ibid:99) and could be argued to be a norm with unobjectionable status. ‘Such 
predominant norms are considered impossible to oppose openly” (Elgström 
2005:29). 
 
It is demanded that Turkish goverment “should align civilian control of the 
military with practice in EU Member States to assure that civilian authorities fully 
exercise their supervisory functions and establish full parliamentary oversight of 
military and defence policy and all related expenditure, including by external 
audit and to abrogate any remaining competence of military courts to try 
civilians.”11 The major institution that attracts EU attention and criticism in this 
context was NSC which should not be more than an advisory body to the 
Government as it is stated in APD 12  for Turkey in 2001 (Öniş, 2003:15). 
 
Resolution of Cyprus issue is one of the most pressing stumbling blocks that 
remain in the way of Turkey’s accession to the EU. As a rule it has stated neither 
in official accession criteria of Copenhagen or in acquis. Nonetheless, when the 
European Council decided at its meeting in Brussels on 17 December 2004 to 
open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005, it linked Turkey’s 
accession process with the Cyprus problem. Turkey reacted to decision arguing 
that EU applied double standarts to Turkey to which EU counter attacked by a 
declaration stating that ‘recognition of all Member States and non-discriminatory 
implementation of the Additional Protocol, are necessary components of the 
accession process… Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the 
overall progress in the negotiations’meaning that Ankara should recognize the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 European Council (2008) Accession Partnership Document with the Republic of  Turkey, 
Brussels, 18 February 2008 (2008/157/EC), p.4 
12 The Accession Partership Document identifies short and medium term priorities, intermediate 
objectives and conditions on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the 
political and economic criteria and the obligations of an acceding state to adopt, implement and 
enforce the  acquis. 
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 Republic of Cyprus before becoming an EU member. (Talmon, 2006:596-606, 
Ulusoy, 2008:318) 
 
Peacefull settlement of Cyprus problem is also pronounced in Negotiation 
Framework of EU for Turkey as a condition for membership. It says “The 
advancement of the negotiations will be guided by [........] Turkey's supports  for a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework”13 
This clause is also repeated in APD of 2006 and again in 2008 after failure of 
Annan plan and entrance of divided Cyprus to EU.  
 
4.4 Outcome: Conditions and Compliance  
The case study covers Turkey’s Europeaanization process divided in different 
time frames due to critical breaktroughs. Europeanization is not a linear proces 
but rather cylical and moves in circles. It can be argued that democratic 
transformation in Turkey has developed in a stop-and-go or up-and down pattern. 
These time frames portray these ups and downs. The process includes the period 
begins with when Turkey was given candidate status in 1999 and is subdivied in 
three phases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase II:2002-2005 
 
From 2002 to 2005 when 
EU has decided to partially 
suspend negotiations in 8 
chapters with Turkey in 
December due to Turkey's 
refusal to apply to Cyprus 
the Additional Protocol to 
the agreement on the EU-
Turkey Customs Union 
Phase I: 1999-2002 
 
From 1999 when Turkey 
was given candidate 
status in Helsnki to 2002 
when Justice and 
Development Party-JDP 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi-AKP) gained 
landslide victory in 
general elections. 
 
Phase III:Post 2005 
 
Most recent period from 
2005 onwards which is 
marked by strong political 
tensions and conflicts at 
national arena and weak 
external incentives which 
paralysed the reform 
process and in stalled 
Europeanization 
 
 
Admitting weak external incentives, there is a slowed but ongoing 
Europeanization process triggered by goverment efforts and demands of change 
agents since 2008. The combinations of external incentives and domestic 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 Negotiating Framework for Turkey, October 2005, p.2 
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 conditions in different nature shape the outcome of the Europeanization process 
leading positive (genuine), slowed, fake/partial and stalled Euopeanization during 
these three phases, would be elaborated below. 
 
4.4.1 Phase I (1999-2002): Partial/Fake Euopeanization 
 
The Helsinki Decision of December 1999 granting Turkey EU candidacy 
status marked a turning point in terms of Turkey-EU relations. By clarifying a 
concrete and a credible membeship perpective, the Helsinki decision put Turkey 
within EU’s irreversible pre-accesion framework which is determined by 
‘conditionality-compliance’ principles (Ulusoy, 2005:1). This implies that Annual 
Progress Reports would be prepared by EU to monitor progress on meeting EU 
criteria. After the Summit the European Commission published first Accession 
Partnership Document in 2000 which was replied by preparation of Turkish 
National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis  (NPAA) by Turkey in 2001.14 
 
Turkey’s EU candidacy since 1999 has helped to instigate a series of radical 
reforms and deep-seated change on the democraization front which in turn 
intensified the Europeanization process in the country (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 
39). Between 1999 and 2002, Turkey experienced a series of ‘rather path 
breaking’ legislative and constitutional changes in order to meet the political 
aspects of the Copenhagen criteria under coalition government of Democratic Left 
Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi-DSP), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-
ANAP) and Nationalist Action Party, (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP).  
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ).
 
Coalition Goverment 
 
The parties formed thecoalition goverment had different/competing ideologies and
views over EU membership thus domestic resonance was low. Claimed to be a social
democratic party, the ideology of the DSP was influenced by nationalistic and state
centric understanding of democracy whereas MHP was an ultra-nationalist party.
ANAP with its liberal orientation could not be able to change the nationalist and
Euro-scpetic configuration of goverment (Baç, 2005:22; Keyman and Öniş, 2007:219-
20                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
Regarding Kurdish question, the capture of PKK commander Öcalan in 1999 
by the Turkish military which ended armed struggle, comperatively reduced cost 
14 In 2003, 2006 and 2008 revised version of Accession Partnership were adopted by 
EC.Accordingly National Programme was revised in 2003 and then in 2008. 
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 of compliance with minority rights (Gunter, 2000:864, Schimmelfennig et al, 
2006:105). What is more important is that emergence of EU conditionality 
triggered a change in the official Kurdish strategy leading to significant reforms 
which directly aimed to improve the rights of Kurds in the country.15 
 
The constitutional amendments of October 2001 removed the restriction on 
the use of any language prohibited by law in the expression and dissemination of 
thought from the constitution. Similarly, restrictive language on broadcasting was 
also removed. In August 2002, the constitutional reform package abolished the 
death penalty in peacetime, revised the Anti-Terror Law, allowed for broadcasting 
in languages other than Turkish. The law that deals with the teaching of foreign 
languages was also amended with the third package in August 2002, opening the 
way for private courses in Kurdish. (Baç, 2005 :22, Aydın and Keyman, 2004:36) 
However, European Commission (2002, p.41-2) concluded that contrary to certain 
hopes expressed notably by some Member States in the context of the Öcalan 
trial, progress on the Kurdish question has not been made. 
 
Concerning military reforms,16 the compliance was also limited where MHP 
holds and extremely nationalist and conservative position and DSP has cordial 
relations with military (Heper and Güney 2000: 647). Both parties have also 
anxieties about process whereas the former is uncomfortable with EU`s agenda on 
multiculturalism and minority rights which they find threatening for integrity and 
national unity of state and the latter is anxious about the process would undermine 
Kemalist ideology of the regime. 
 
With the 2001 constitutional amendments, a number of fundamental changes 
have been made to the duties, functioning and composition of the NSC whereby 
the ‘advisory’ nature of the NSC was enshrined in the constitution stressing that 
its role is limited to recommendations. The government is no longer obliged to 
‘give priority’ to the Council’s advice but only to ‘assess’ the views so conveyed. 
Moreover, the number of civilian members of the NSC has been increased from 
five to nine while the number of the military representatives remains same (Faltas 
and Jansen, 2006: 39). However as it has pronounced in 2002 Regular report for 
Turkey NSC-related changes did not seem to have altered ‘the way in which the 
National Security Council operates in practice’.17 Commission also underlines in 
its report that the NSC has continued to be an important factor in domestic politics 
where opinions of its military members continue to carry great weight although 
decisions are taken by majority. Its conclusions, statements or recommendations 
on sensitive political issues continue to strongly influence the political process. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15 See Appendix C Box 4 Reforms undertaken on the Kurdish issue 
16  See Appendix C, Box 5 Reforms undertaken to decrease the influence of the military in politics 
17 European Commission, 2002 Regular Progress Report for Turkey, p.25 
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 Cyprus issue was not on the agenda during this phase. In 1999 Helsinki 
European Council, where EU decided not to condition the RoC accession to the 
settlement of the conflict, decided to grant Turkey the candidate status and to 
condition Turkey’s EU accession to the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Thus 
the rule legitimacy was low during the period .The 2002 progress report on 
Turkey welcomed Turkish government ‘s support for the current process of direct 
talks between the leaders of the two communities. However goverment did not 
take any substantial step towards comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus 
problem and delayed it to an undetermined future. 
 
In sum,  goverment’s efforts to comply with EU demands through several 
reforms ‘could not move beyond tactical concessions since credible external 
incentives were thwarted by unfavourable domestic conditions; i.e high domestic 
adoption costs, competing elite strategies, strong veto players and low level of 
domestic resonance’ (Schimmelfennig et al, 2006:106). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What about civic actors? 
 
It should be also noted that civil society was not qualitatively strong enough in Turkey to 
resist against veto players and put presuusre on goverment for continuation of the reforms. 
As argued elsewhere (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005), the strong-state tradition, the organic 
vision of society, and the republican model of citizenship together has established the 
foundational basis for the state-centric mode of operation of Turkish modernity. It is 
within this context that civil society in Turkey is still far from enjoying the kind of 
presence and influence that is generally associated with civil society in the EU states 
(Piccoli, 2005: 17) However the post- Helsinki era witnessed the empowerment of certain 
civic actors outside government such as interest groups, big business community-
especially -TUSIAD-NGOs and other civil society organizations (İçduygu, 2005). 
(TUSIAD-Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmens’Association) 
 
 
When the timing of reform steps in 2001 and 2002 is taken it into account, it is 
argued that the compliance was fake/shallow where reforms have been oriented 
towards the EU timetable for the updating of the Progress Report on Turkey and 
EU decision-making on the opening of accession negotiations (Schimmelfennig et 
al, 2003:509). The European Commission (2002, p. 139) concluded that ‘Turkey 
has made noticeable progress … [but] does not fully meet the political criteria’. 
Moreover, the Commission (2002, p. 47) demanded to see the implementation in 
practice to decide on the opening of membership negotiations (European Council, 
2002, pp. 5–6). The outcome of first phase, accordingly, may be regarded as 
partial/fake Europeanization. 
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         4.4.2 Phase II (2002-2005): Positive Europeanization 
 
In November 2002, AKP, describing itself as a conservative democratic party 
reflected in its program and practices, won a landslide victory in general elections 
(Özbudun, 2006). The party alone won almost two-thirds of the seats in the 
Parliament with just 34 percent of the valid votes while Republican People’s Party 
(CHP-Cumhuriyet Halk Partsi) received 19 percent of the votes and became the 
only opposition party (Çarkoglu, 2002, Tosun, 2003) This new goverment was 
more liberal and pro-European although CHP has developed anti-European and 
neo nationalist rhetoric, paradoxically emerged as a veto player and became 
increasingly alienated from the EU during the process. However since AKP 
gained enough seats to change the constitution on its own, thus the domestic 
resonance increased (Schimmelfennig et al, 2006:107) 
 
Regarding Kurdish question, the AKP goverment had a highly cosmopolitan 
strategy but nationalistic elements somewhat subdued which would albeit revive 
in the next phase. However goverment withdrew many discriminative measures 
that limited individual freedoms of Kurdish citizens such as opening of Kurdish 
courses in three cities in the south-eastern Anatolia lifting of Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law 18 which expanded freedom of speech, granting the right to name 
children in Kurdish which in practice was used to ban non-Turkish names 
(through using letter Q-X-W), retrial of the Democracy Party (DEP) 
parliamentarians who had been in jail since 1994 for supporting terrorism and 
Kurdish separatism in Turkey (cf. Leyla Zana)  and abolishing the death penalty 
in all circumstances, including wartime (Baç, 2005 :26; Aydın and Keyman, 2004, 
36). These reforms19 which broke many taboos led to a radical extension of 
cultural rights especially for Kurdish segments of population. 
 
The military elite and Kemalist bureaucracy were not comfortable with the EU 
reforms carrying risks for unity and security of Turkish state and Kemalist 
ideology. However, in an environment where the country was adjusting major 
political reforms process and there was strong support for EU membership coming 
from public and pressure from civil society actors, the power and resilience of the 
Euro-skeptic elements diminished, anti-reformist actors were politically 
marginalized (Öniş, 2005:6). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
18Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law criminalised ‘propaganda against the indivisible unity of the 
state’ and had been used in the past to imprison a large amount of journalists and publishers. 
19 See Appneidx B, Box 4, for the reforms undertaken on Kurdish issue 
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Civil Society Activism in post-Helsinki era 
One of the most crucial and exciting developments of the post-Helsinki era was
emergence of domestic actors outside the goverment such as interest groups, big business
community-especially TUSIAD- NGOs and other civil society organizations as supporters
of EU reform process. With the increased crebility of EU membership perpective
visibility and activities of these actors in political arena have increased through putting
pressure on goverment for launching and/or continuing democtratic reforms. In this sense
it can be said that Europeanisation process has provided a positive anchor and external
pressure role for the emergence of these societal actors for further democratization
(İçduyu, 2005:3) It was the pincer in which external and internal actors put pressure on
goverment that trigger reform process in post-Helsinki era.  
Although the reforms were far from producing deep-rooted changes which 
would multiculturalism and lead to a gradual transformation of the notion of 
citizenship in the country (Keyman, 2009:20) they broke ossified understanding 
on Kurdish issue thus 2004 regular Report, in general, has a more positive tone 
than the previous ones with a special emphasis on the progress achieved in the 
field of Kurdish rights. 
 
With regard to democratic control of military AKP goverment modified 
structure, competences and duties of NSC and its Secretariat General with 
‘seventh reform package’ in 2003 which constitutes nothing less than a “quiet 
revolution.”20Through these reforms NSC was transformed into a purely 
consultative body with limited impact. Its budget and numbers of meeting were 
reduced. The budget would be monitored by a parliamentary Court of Auditors.  
 
The position of the Secretary General of the NSC, traditionally reserved for a 
military official, was revised and it was decided to have a civilian as its secretary 
general. The AKP government adopted the another reform package after it won in 
local elections in 2004 to meet the Copenhagen criteria. This package made 
crucial amendments to the Constitution, abolishing state security courts, 
eliminating the NSC’s Secretary General representative from High Audio Visual 
Board (RTÜK)–the Kemalist dominated national broadcasting agency, thereby 
decreasing its control over Turkish broadcasting. and removing the Chief of 
Staff’s representative from the Higher Education Board (YÖK) as another domain 
of Kemalists 21  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
20 A quiet revolution: Less power for Turkey's army is a triumph for the EU", Financial Times 
(editorial), July 31, 2003. 
21 YÖK was established after the 1980 military coup with a mission of controlling universities.It 
is another domain of Kemalists targeted for institutional reform by AKP goverment (Patton, 
2007:351). 
41
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why military actors remained silent? 
 
Although AKP goverment’s reform packages were threatening for privileged position
of military, the military actors did not show harsh reactions since AKP has taken the
secular order as its basic reference point and had strong western orientation with full
commitment to EU membership (Öniş, 2006:9). However it should be also noted that
military actors have been undergoing a self-learning process with Europeanization
process which leads to behavioral change (Öniş and Keyman, 2007 :67). This
learning process is promising for healthier relations with civil-military actors in long
term.  
 
 
The 2004 Regular Report also noted that although the ‘military continues to 
enjoy a degree of autonomy [as it is] not accountable to the civilian structure, the 
civilian control of the military has been strengthened through a number of changes 
which have shifted the balance of civil-military relations towards the civilians’ 
[…] (p.15) Consequently, in the second phase the compliance with regard to 
military reform was at a higher level. 
 
In the second phase of the process UN led the negotiations on the Cyprus 
conflict under the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ 22 proposing to reunify the island, before 
joining the EU. For a long time the Turkish public had become accustomed to the 
view that ‘no solution is the solution in Cyprus and advocating ideas challenging 
the status quo in Cyprus amounted to virtual treason’ (Baracani, 2007:18) 
However AKP goverment altered status quo oriented state policy on Cyprus with 
consensus seeking approach whcih was a proceeding of a Europenization 
framework. 
 
AKP goverment supported Annan Plan for reunification of island distancing 
itself from Denktash policies. Goverment also tried to delink Europeanization 
process of country from Cyprus dispute. Even military chose to remain silent 
concerns the developments in Cyprus. The support that the Turkish government 
has given to Annan Plan which has been approved in the referendum on the 
Turkish-Cypriot side, means that “Turkey can no longer easily be blamed for the 
island’s continued division” (Diez, 2005:174) 
 
AKP’s liberal and pluralist approach in identity politics (namely Kurdish, 
minorities) secularist dicsourse (helped to legitimize their political standing in 
front of veto players-Kemalist centers of judiciary, military and state bureaucracy) 
and problem-solving and consensus-seeking perspective towards problems 
(Cyprus conflict) within framework of “Europeanization” resulted in low 
domestic adoption costs and higher domestic resonance  (Schimmelfennig et al. 
                                                                                                                                              
22 See Appendix C, Box 6 Annan Plan for Settlement of Cyprus Dispute   
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 2006:107). The impressive legal and constitutional change and AKP 
government’s efforts to implement these changes, have upgraded Turkish 
democracy which were also supported by civic actors. 
 
All of thesepositive developments were welcomed by the European Council. 
Due to this decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process” 
Council decided that ‘Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria 
to open accession negotiations […]’23. Consequently, the accession negotiations 
were decided to open on 3rd October 2005. The second phase, therefore may be 
regarded as positive Europeanization where strong external incentives are meet 
with far more favourable domestic conditions. 
4.4.3 Phase III (Post 2005): Stalled Europeanization 
The relations with EU reached its apex during AKP government with opening 
of membership negotiations on 3rd of October in 2005. The incentive based 
model assumes that the credibility of conditional rewards increases via the 
opening accession negotiations with the candidate states (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005:14). The case of Turkey demonstrates exactly the opposite 
outcome in contrast to this assumption since Turkey’s domestic situation was not 
amenable at that time to push forward significant requirements. 
 
The post-2005 period in the country, was marked by high political tensions 
and conflicts which resulted in worsening of EU-Turkey relations and paralysing 
of reform process. Moreover Turkish government seemed to have lost much of its 
initial European zeal and increasingly displayed signs of ‘reform fatigue’, 
hesitating to push hard for implementation and enforcement of the EU reforms 
(Patton, 2007:340) and the public support for EU membership appears to have 
declined by a considerable margin (Öniş, 2009 :41). 24 
 
Regarding Kurdish issue, AKP’s policy towards Kurdish problem lost its pre-
election multicultural and pluralistic vision. Given the resurgence of Kurdish 
terrorism and PKK violence in south-eastern Anatolia and in big cities during the 
course of 2006, the nationalist segments were fulled and it became hard and costly 
for goverment to stick to its pluralist discourse of national identity (Onar, 
2007:285). AKP’s discourse towards identity issues has turned into more hard 
core nationalist in 2008. AKP’s approach appeared to converge to the traditional 
repressive approach of the Turkish state, thus pendulum once again swung 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
23 The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meeting in Brussels on 16-17 December 
2004, p.6 
24 In 2004 almost 70% of the population was in favour EU membership, wheras in 2006 the level  
of support decreased under 50% ( See Appendix D Figure 1) 
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 towards the old style strong state tradition and ethnically exclusive nationalism 
(Öniş, 2009 :43). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Either leave or love the country” 
 
Erdogan bluntly declared that “all Kurds who were not happy in Turkey should leave 
the country” during a visit to the predominantly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir in 
southeast Anatolia. Erdogan’s controversial statement was greeted with shock, not 
least because “his words appeared to echo the Love it or leave it” slogan of the 
ultranationalist MHP (Jenkins, 2009) 
 
Due to these events which threatened to deteriorate relations between Turks 
and Kurds at societal level and questioned the continuation of reforms on Kurdish 
issue, Kurdish-related reforms in has entered a period of inertia the where several 
reforms (such as launching of a channel broadcasting in languages other than 
Turkish)  has been delayed. 25 
 
With the regard the role of military in politics, it can be said that military’s 
voice has been heard more loudly during ths period. AKP’s recent Islamic 
statements and controversial activities such as; enthusiastic attempts for 
promotion of religious freedoms allowing female students to enter schools and 
universities with their headscarves and announcement of its candidate for the 
presidential election as Abdullah Gül whose wife has a headscarfled led to harsh 
Islamists-Kemalist (militarist) confrontation over secularism and strengthen 
Kemalists’ hands in their arguments about the AKP’s hidden project. 
(Islamization of the state26)  (Öniş, 2009:44, Cornell, 2008:3).  
 
The military replied to these Islamic attempts by an unusually harsh anti-
government statement, which came to be known as the “e-memorandum,” and 
issued on the general staff’s website. Following the military’s move Kemalist 
circles organized huge demonstrations to show Kemalist principles are still in a 
sense the main principles of political activity and remain enthusiastically guarded 
by large numbers of Kemalists- military elite, intellectuals, judges, politicians and 
officers which became obvious by chief prosecutor’s submission of a case for 
AKP’s closure on account of constituting a focal point for undermining 
secularism (Cornell and Karaveli, 2008:33) The polarised elite resistance to 
membership found ample opportunities for manipulating the public agenda and  
shrinking  the mass support for EU by providing misinformation to the public and 
strategically shaping the rhetoric around the “sensitive issues” (Aydın and 
Çarkoğlu, 2006:69). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
25 European Commission, 2008 Regular Progress Report for Turkey, p.26 
26 see Appendix C, Box 3-Islamization of the state 
 44
 After years of silence, military again used its influence over politics and 
showed it is still in the game. Moreover the situation was worsened by revival of 
terrorist activities which resulted in adoption of amendments to the Anti-terror 
law in 2006. The amendements granted security forces more extensive authority 
to deal with terrorism, including the removal of safeguards against torture. As 
Öniş clearly stated “the new Anti-Terror Law clearly marked a major step 
backwards in Turkey’s recent democratization” (2009 :44). 
 
Europeanization process in Turkey came face to face with a serious critical 
juncture just 13 months later after the negotiations started. The negotiations 
appear to be on the brink of the “train crash” which Enlargement Commissioner 
Olli Rehn warned against in early autumn, 27 when Turkey refused to open its 
ports and airports to trade with Republic of Cyprus. In light of this situation, the 
European Council meeting in Brussels on 14–15 December 2006 decided to 
suspend eight chapters from the accession negotiations with Turkey. At the EU 
Summit, the ‘train crash’ was avoided. However, it was clear at this conjuncture 
that the ‘Cyprus problem would hamper Turkey–EU relations as long as the 
paralysis over this issue continued’ (Ulusoy, 2008: 320). 
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Cyprus: Why is it a deadlock? 
 
EU’s decision to partly suspend negotiatins with Turkey was prompted by Turkey's
continuing refusal to also apply to Cyprus the additional protocol to the agreement on the
EU-Turkey Customs Union. This protocol was adopted in summer 2005 and intends to
expand the agreement to cover all new Member States that acceded to the Union on 1 May
2004. In practice, the issue concerns opening up Turkish ports and airports to ships and
aircraft of the Republic of Cyprus. However, Turkey's government is only prepared to do
this if direct trade between the EU and the breakaway TRNC is also permitted. However,
such a step is being blocked within the Union by the new EU Member State Cyprus.  
 
It could be said that the legitimacy of rule has decreased by accession of a 
ivided Cyprus to EU with the acquis communitaire applying only for its southern 
art although it was the Greek side who said no in referandum to the Annan Plan 
hich was for settlement of the dispute via re-unification of the island.28 Thus the 
ngoing political tension in the country was reinforced by partially suspending of 
he negotiations and decreasing level of credibility and leigtimacy of extenal 
ncentives which engendered stalled Europeanization.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
7 Oli Rehn, “Turkey’s best response is a rock-solid commitment to reforms” Ankara, 3 October 
006, SPEECH/06/559. 
8 Eurobarometer, shows that the image of the EU as a whole has dropped significantly in the eyes 
f Turkish citizens in 2006 (43% of Turks view the EU positively and 41% of the population  trust 
n EU) (See Appendix D, Figure 3 ) 
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 The concessions demanded by the EU in Cyprus and the question of Kurdish 
rights further fuel Turkish neo-nationalism and populism (Cornell and Karaveli, 
2008: 45, Grigoriadis, 2006:9-12). Politically, veto players use the Kurdish issue 
and Cyprus conflict to present themselves to the voters as a truly ‘patriotic’ force, 
which preserves Turkish national legacy and does not ‘put it up for sale’. This 
environment is extremely dangerous for Turkey’s further democratization process 
since it provides great opportunities for veto players who tend to nationalize and 
polarize political issues and thus mobilize EU-reluctant voters. As a result the 
process may drift away from positive Europeanization or in other words turn to a 
‘negative Europeanization’.   
4.4.4 An Unexpected Move: Ongoing Europeanization? 
 
Turkish reform process stalled by the decline in the credibility of EU 
conditionality and the veto players incurred high adoption costs. However,  the 
Turkish government has still been launching several democratic reforms since 
2008. As Olli Rehn has said that ‘there is a slowing down because of works 
further down the tracks, however the Train continues to move’. Thus the period 
since 2008 can be regarded as slowed but ongoing Europeanization.  
 
In January 2008 Turkey’s first official 24-hour Kurdish-language television 
channel (TRT-6) started broadcasting. Then, goverment welcomed the recent 
opening of departments of Kurdish literature at Dicle and Istanbul University, a 
bill introduced in November by DTP deputy. These positive developments can be 
interpreted as ‘possible sings of a renewed impetus on the part of AKP goverment 
to revitalize its drive to Europeanization’ (Öniş, 2009a:32) 
 
The rising trend of the reforms in spite of the consideraby lower level of EU 
credibility and of public support29 can partly be explained by pro-reformist 
government which is dissatisfied by the status quo and by the internal demand for 
change comng from change agents especially business communities, NGOs and 
intelligentsia (Yılmaz, 2009). Consequently, EU anchor is perceived and used by 
policy makers and change agents to gain sufficient strength and credibility to 
relaunch and advance domestic reform process (Tocci, 2005:75, Aydin and 
Carkoglu, 2006:81). In the AKP’s rhetoric, the EU anchor is also portrayed as a 
means of attaining the objectives of reform, which are as important as 
membership itself (Tocci, 2005: 80). Indeed PM Erdoğan reconfirmed this stating 
that ‘Turkey will adopt the Copenhagen political criteria and considers them as 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
29 The level of public support for EU membeship decreased to 42% in second half of 2008 (See  
Appendix D Figure 2) 
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 Ankara criteria’. He underlined that ‘we continue progressing on our own path 
even if the EU fails to open accession talks with Turkey’ 30 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
30  Erdogan: Copenhagen criteria would become Ankara criteria”, Journal of Turkish Weekly 
(JTW), July 2005 
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 5. Serbia: ‘Caught in trap of past’ or 
Turning the EU Corner? 
 
 
 
“The world asks – how much does it cost being Serb? How much for your 
memory? How much for your history?... It is better that we pay you to be someone 
else, not who you are”                                                                          Boris  Tadić      
 
Serbia has been an illiberal regime which had been dominated by a nationalist 
and/or authoritarian leadership under Milošević, until 2000. This strong influence 
of the authoritarian heritage impacts on the present day leading to a large extent of 
Euroscepticism in country. However with the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, 
Serbia's new leaders announced that Serbia would seek to join the EU (Subotic, 
forthcoming). Addressing its unreformed nationalist ideology, entrenched veto 
players, and mutually hostile elites, the lessons learned from Serbian case point to 
a more general conclusion about the relationship between EU conditionality and 
Europeanization.  
5.1 Conflict and NormViolation: The Miloševic 
Heritage and Absence of European Idea  
Due to its legacies of war, communist heritage; the political culture of statism 
and authoritanism remained deeply embedded in Serbia. Since non-democratic 
political culture remained dominant in which narrow natonalistic and populist 
interests have a very strong influence, the identification with Europe could not be 
reached and country faced significant challenges in Europeanization process 
(Jano, 2008:59).  
 
Serbian political identity in the 1990s under the reign of Milošević was shaped 
by victim-centered nationalism, unsettled regional status, and a profound sense of 
historical injustice which has resulted in hostility to norms of international 
community (here is EU). Serbia’s attitude toward Europe is a deeply conflicted 
one since “European idea” is not broadly shared as in some other East European 
countries and Serbian elites displayed strong ideological obstinacy to 
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 Europeanize.31 Thus level of identificaion with Europe has been significantly 
lower in Serbia when it is compared with Turkey. 
 
In the post-Miloševic era the newly democratic Serbia is also shaped by 
values, beliefs and institutions (military, police and the secret service) from the 
old regime which continue to influence present developments and has been 
supported by majorities of the Serbian elite and public. Within a path-dependant 
approach, it can be said that historical legacies have left their traits in political 
elite behavior where elites continued to show resistance to EU requirements. 
(Pop-Eleches, 2007). This continuation of Miloševic era policies also manifested 
itself in Serbia’s very ambivalent attitudes towards Europe.  
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Serbian political culture and path dependecy 
 
Nicole Gallina (2007) presents a path-dependent approach arguing that a change of
political elite culture has taken place only partly after the establishment of a liberal
democratic framework in Eastern Central Europe. Within a path-dependent
approach, values, beliefs and institutions from the old regime may be regarded as
assets that continue to influence present developments.I argue that this approach can
also be used to analyse impact of Miloševic regime on Serbia’s present political
developments. 
  
 
As Subotic (2009:30) very well puts it; ‘Europe was imagined as taking 
omething away – territory (Kosovo), national pride (humiliation of losing the 
alkan wars), and collective memory of the past (by writing a new historical 
ranscript at the Hague).’ When the EU put government’s co-operation with the 
CTY to capture and extradite suspected war criminals, as a condition for the 
pening and continuation of negotiations, it became a challenge to the national 
eritage and historical legacies. However what makes the situation more 
hallenging is EU’s pressure on government to recognize Kosovo which is an 
nacceptable for most of Serbian elites (army, old communist political elites, the 
erbian Orthodox Church, establishment intelligentsia and the largely unreformed 
nd unprofessionalized media) and the Serbian people. Consequently, complying 
ith EU demands potentially cause high domestic political costs for government. 
.1.1 Cooperation with the Hague (ICTY) 
Serbia was obligated to cooperate with the ICTY by arresting and transferring 
ar crimes suspect, in particular Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić in order to 
                                                                                                                                              
1 Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009. 
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 keep its relations close with EU and to receive financial aid. Besides its practical 
implications the issue has high symbolic value for national identity where these 
generals are regarded as national heroes. For European actors, cooperation with 
ICTY has been regarded as a means of signalling a clean break with past. 
However cooperation with ICTY is contradictory for collective understanding of 
public reflecting that Serbian nation fought a just war and was victim rather than 
perpetrator. 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who are they: Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić? 
 
Karadžić was Former Bosnian Serb political leader and Mladić was the Chief of Staff
of the Bosnian Serb Army during the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. There has been an
outstanding international arrest warrant against both men following the Rule 61 of
ICTY which concluded that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they have
committed the crimes in question, including genocide of 8,000 Bosniak Muslims in
Srebrenica. Karadžić has been was been indicted for war crimes by the ICTY in July
2008. Mladić is still fugitive.  
 
 
 
The Serbian elites and majority of the public therefore mostly opposed and 
rejected the Hague Tribunal which had traditionally been perceived as an anti-
Serb institution trying to indicate Serbs.33 However there are different views and 
approaches towards ICTY cooperation and EU conditionality within Serbian 
elites: conservatives and reformists.  
 
The conservatives -Euro resisters- gathered around (former) President 
Koštunica included traditional nationalists, but also significant numbers of former 
Miloševic loyalists - mostly from Miloševic’s SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia) and 
the extremist SRS (Serbian Radical Party) - who flocked to Kostunica’s DSS- 
Democratic Party of Serbia). The conservatives displayed general hostility 
towards normative Europeanization; and strongly opposed cooperation with ICTY 
due to ideological but also political and populist reasons. They concentrate on 
identity politics and issues of nationality in order to justify their EU-reluctance 
and mobilize frustrated voters (Gallina, 2007:75-91). They had significant support 
among the army, old communist political elites, the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
establishment intelligentsia and media. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
32 Belgrade Center for Human Rights, An Analysis of a Public Opinion Survey on the ICTY with 
Comments and Recommendations (Belgrade: BCHR, 2005), 372.  
33 Public opinion in Serbia - Attitudes towards the ICTY -survey undertaken by Belgrade Centre 
for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing Research in, 2004 shows that attitude to ICTY is 
exteremly negative and even every fourth citizen thinks that there should be no cooperation under 
no circumstances despite being uninformed about ICTY activities and trials. Three quarter of 
citizens interpret ICTY mission as world conspiracy against Serbs and Serbia and more than two 
thirds of the population think ICTY tries to indicated Serbs in a biased manner (See Appendix D, 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 ) 
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 The reformists-instrumental promoters of Europeanization gathered around 
the Democratic Party (DS) led first by Prime Minister Djindjic, and after his 2003 
assassination around his heirs Zivkovic and Tadic. Democratic Party linked 
cooperation with the ICTY to European integration and positioned themselves as 
supporter of European integration, reform, and internationalism. “Europe is our 
house and no price is too high to pay… I am for Europe,” Djindjic famously said, 
implying that his opponents were not. The party got support from most cabinet 
members, major business and technocratic elites, from most of Serbia’s civil 
society sector which hase been too weak to really matter and from public. The 
public opinion polls also illustrate Serbian membership to the EU continues to 
receive support, varying depending on the circumstances, but never lower than 60 
percent.34 
 
Although the two camps frequently differed on matters of policy, their biggest 
point of disagreement was on issues of cooperation with ICTY and the path 
towards European integration.35 As Subotic (forthcming) argues the domestic 
political conflict over competing elite strategies therefore directly shaped 
Europeanization outcomes which is also endorsed by Pridham “Opposition to EU 
inspired change might exist because of a strong nationalist constituency as in 
Serbia which is an interestingcase because of divided opinions there and the close 
balance between them.” 36 
         5.1.2 Kosovo: Serbs ‘Jerusalem’ 
 
 
 
A field like no other,Heaven above it, Heaven below.. 
Vasko Popa 
 
In addition to cooperation with the Hague, recognition of independent Kosovo 
is another issue where EU put pressure on goverment. The status of Kosovo, 
formally a province of Serbia but under international administrationsince 1999 
allows nationalist mobilization and distracts from democratic reforms.37 
 
Kosovo represents a constitutive part of the Serbian national mythology.38 The 
question of Kosovo goes to heart of the question of Serbian statehood which Serbs 
frame it in nationalist terms (Batt, 2005:33) In words of Foreign Minister Vuk 
Jeremic ‘It is their Jerusalem’ This is also underlined by Subotic “Kosovo is a 
cornerstone of Serbian constructed national identity. There is complete agreement 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
34 See Appendix D Figure 8 and Figure 9 
35See Appendix D Figure 6 
36 Author’s interview with Geoffrey Pridham, 14 April 2009. 
37 Serbia Country Report , Nations in Transit 2006, Freedom House, p.1 
38 See Tim Judah, Kosovo : What everyone needs to know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), Tim  Judah, The Serbs : History, myth, and the destruction of Yugoslavia ed. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000) 
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 in Serbia – across different elites – that without Kosovo, Serbs will no longer be 
Serbs. This sentiment is shared across all segments of society. It is partly 
nationalist mythology, partly a continuation of Serbian sense of victimization and 
loss, and party a foundational bloc of Serbian identity. This will be very difficult 
for Serbia to overcome.” 39 
 
The major constitutional preamble of Serbia states that Kosovo is a 
constitutive, ‘inalienable’ part of Serbia. Thus, the prospect of losing Kosovo was 
widely perceived as a profound blow to Serbian identity and the Serbian state by 
not only conservative nationalists but also moderates and reformers (Subotic, 
2009:38). The Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 even 
worsened the situation where even the government dissolved on grounds of lack 
of consensus to deal with Kosovo.40  
 
Serbian’s refusal to accept Kosovo’s declaration of interdependence has 
further complicated its relationship with the EU, while European support of 
Kosovo’s independence angered Serbia and dramatically soured its desire to 
Europeanize. Subotic argues that “EU requirement that Serbia recognizes 
Kosovo’s independence has so delegitimized EU in the eyes of the Serbian elites 
and population, that the EU is no longer considered a desirable group to join (EU 
is seen as taking something away from Serbia, not giving Serbia anything in 
return). The issue of Kosovo and EU conditionality around Kosovo has then 
greatly benefited right-wing nationalist parties, which have pushed for Serbia’s 
increasing ties with Russia.”41 
 
The issue of cooperation with ICTY has degraded to a lower level and become 
more obsolete as the new crisis namely instability following Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence was looming large. The earlier trade off – Europe for The Hague 
– was now replaced by a new one – Europe for Kosovo (Subotic, 2009: 38). In a 
speech a few days after Kosovo declared independence, Tadic pleaded that Serbia 
has been part of Europe for two centuries and should join the EU as a whole, not 
without a part of its territory: “The world asks – how much does it cost being 
Serb? How much for your memory? How much for your history?... It is better that 
we pay you to be someone else, not who you are…. For us to sit at the table of the 
European family as the only state that got its seat through an indecent trade, 
denying its own memory and identity… I do not know how to make such a 
bargain.” 42 In sum these two political problems – the Hague and Kosovo – and 
the European requirements regarding them profoundly shaped the process and 
outcome of Europeanization process in Serbia. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
39 Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009. 
40 “Divisions over Kosovo cripple Serb government”, The Daily Telegraph, 8 March 2008 
41 Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009 
42 B92, February 15, 2008  
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 5.2 European Demands and Conditions 
 
The EU ‘democratization’ platform for Serbia has been very inclusive, and it 
captured proposed reforms many areas. Thus it is larger than Copenhagen political 
criteria, which include regional cooperation (Kosovo-related issues) good 
neighborly relations with enlargement countries and member states, and respect 
for international obligations (such as cooperation with the UN ICTY) that quickly 
proved to be Serbia’s stumbling block on the road to Brussels. 
          
There is general 
tendency in public that the EU constantly imposes new conditions for accession of 
Serbia to the EU thereby placing Serbia in unfavourable situation in relation to 
any other counry. This implies low level of legitimacy of EU conditions.43 
 
The cooperation with the ICTY has been European Union’s primary, if not 
only, measurement of how far along Serbia was in adopting the idea of addressing 
crimes from its recent past since it was a measurable indicator -number of 
suspects arrested and transferred to The Hague, number of documents and 
testimonies sent, could all be classified, systematized and easily counted. This, in 
turn, then became shorthand for Serbia’s readiness to accept international justice 
standards and its desire to Europeanize (Subotic, forthcoming; Orthenlicher, 2008, 
pp.52-8). Most specifically, “[......] full cooperation with the ICTY is an 
international obligation and one of the key priorities of the European Partnership” 
as it is stated clearly in Commission’s progress report on Serbia (2008:21)  
 
However, the strength of the EU’s commitment to that linkage has been 
diluted over time. The EU has officially resumed SAA negotiations with Serbia in 
June 2007. In April 2008 EU signed SAA along with the Interim Agreement with 
Serbia, despite of Serbia’s continuing failure to deliver the two major suspects- 
Mladić and Karadžić. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conditional Implamentation of SAA 
 
The implementation of the SAA was made conditional on proof of cooperation with
international justice. The Dutch goverment in particular was adamant that the arrest of
Mladic must remain the condition for further rapprochement with the EU. 
 
In this sense the Council stated that “full cooperation with the ICTY, including all
possible efforts to arrest and transfer indictees, is an essential element of these
Agreements. EU ministers agreed to submit the SAA to their parliaments for ratification
and the Community agreed to implement the Interim Agreement as soon as the Council
decides that Serbia is fully cooperating with the ICTY.”   
 
European Commission (2008), Serbia Progress Report, COM (2008)674, p.5                                                                                                                                               
 
3 See Appendix D, Figure 10  
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The main reason behind EU’s willingness to put Serbia on a fast track toward 
membership was to gain more credibility and room or manoeuvre to pressure on 
Serbia to accept the inevitable independence of Kosovo at a time when long-
protracted negotiations over the territory’s status were exhausted without an 
agreed solution.44 In a move vehemently opposed by Serbia, Kosovo declared 
independence on February 17, 2008 which led to collapse of goverment and 
deterioration of relations with EU. Although European integration process is not 
officially conditional to recognition of Kosovo, EU asks for developing regional 
cooperation which indirectly points Kosovo issue. The the majority public (70%) 
indeed perceive recognizing Kosovo as a condition for Serbia's EU integration.45 
 
5.3 Outcome: Conditions and Compliance  
The case study covers Serbia’s Europeaanization process since Serbia went 
through a mostly peaceful democratic transition, overthrowing the autocratic 
regime of Milošević at the ballot box in October 2000 and is subdivied in three 
phases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase I: 2000-2003 
 
From 2000 to 2003 when 
the prime minister Zoran 
Djindjic, a center-left 
moderate, assassinated in 
March 2003 by a 
paramilitary group due to 
his actions for arresting 
Miloševic and transferring 
him to The Hague and, 
when Serbia was given 
potential candidate country 
status for EU accession 
following the Thessaloniki 
European Council of June. 
Phase II:2003-2005 
 
From 2003 when Serbia 
gained a EU 
membership pe
in Thessaloniki to 200
where negotiations for a 
Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement 
(SAA) with Serbia 
launched  
rspective 
5 
Phase III:2005-2008 
 
From 2005 to 2008 when 
the EU and Serbia signed 
the SAA includes the 
period of frozen of 
association negotiations 
between May 2006 and 
June 2007 due to non-
complaince of Serbia with 
EU conditions co-
operation with ICTY  
 
         
                                                                                                                                                        
 
44 See Susanne Simon, “EU agreement even without surrendering Mladić; Stability more important 
than arrest of war criminals,” Die Welt, Dec. 18, 2007 
45 See Appendix D, Figure 7, B92 Public Pull results  
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    5.3.1 Phase I (2000-2003): Stalled Europeanization 
 
 
After outsting of Miloševic in October 2000 which was regarded as triumph of 
pro-European politicans, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia-DOS 46 goverment 
where Koštunica was President and Djindjic was Prime minister, sought 
rapprochment with internatinal community and started to reintegrate into Europe’s 
regional organization. Only days after the new government took over, the EU has 
radically revised its policy toward Serbia first lifted its long-lasting economic 
sanctions against Serbia, pledged billions in reconstruction aid and officially 
endorsed the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for Serbia. However the 
increased credibility of external incentives was thwarted by low level of 
legitimacy of European conditions (especially cooperation with ICTY) and 
unfavourable domestic factors. 
 
To deal with the issue of the past, specifically the Milošević wars and war 
crimes became a challenge for the new transitional government. Illiberal 
nationalists have continued to play a prominent and toxic role in Serbian politics 
(Orentlicher, 2008:19) which became obvious with Prime Minister Djindjic’s 
assassination. Then on June 28, 2001 Miloševic was arrested for corruption and 
abuse of power and transferred to The Hague, in an operation coordinated by 
Djindjic. “Our country’s place is in the international community,” Djindjić said 
following Milošević’s transfer to The Hague in order to justify his action however 
could not rescue himself from the tragic end. 
 
Djindjic’s assassination was a crucial moment in Serbia’s democratic 
transition. His death significantly weakened the reformist government and 
therefore provided a huge power vacuum, which was immediately filled by anti-
EU forces -Kostunica’s DSS and by the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party 
(SRS) in the 2003 elections. After re-election Kostunica went back to his 
entrenched position of non-compliance and anti-EU, hard line nationalist policies 
(Subotic, forthcoming). 
 
The assassination proved that current limited progress of reform and 
integration with EU was vulnerable, impeded by extereme nationalism and war 
legacy and hed been enoguh to stop Serbian reforms which were ongoing due to 
pragmatic cost-beneft calculations rather than deep commitment with European 
values and norms.Therefore the first phase of Europeanization was marked by 
absence of European idea, high political cost of adoption, competing elite 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
46 The DOS itself was a coalition of two main parties and personalities: the Democratic Party of 
Serbia (DSS) led by new president Vojislav Kostunica and the Demoratic Party (DS) led by prime 
minister Zoran Djindjic 
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 strategies over Europe, low level of resonance and still robust existence of old 
regime spoilers which resulted in stalled Europeanization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-learning process 
However there is one point that should not be missed in Djindjic’s assassination. It 
was the first step toward acknowledging Serbian responsibility for atrocious crimes 
and unequivocally condemning them and started a lerning process where ICTY began 
to educate the Serbian public about atrocities— especially about crimes committed by 
their political leaders (Orhendlicher, 2008:22) The long term effects of this learning 
process would help to change nature of Europeanization from stalled or fake to 
positive during coming years. 
5.3.2 Phase II (2003-2005) : Fake Europeanization 
 
The second phase begins with EU’s attempts to make its policy towards WB 
more credible through Thessaloniki European Council in June where SAP, 
leading to conclusion of SAA and thereafter the perspective of eventual EU 
membership is confirmed for for all Western Balkan countries including Serbia. In 
response to this strong external incentive and intense international pressure for 
failing to work closely with the Court, the Kostunica government instituted a new 
strategy of “voluntary surrenders” where state would guarantee the suspects if 
they surrender volutarily. As a result of this new initiaive, a total of 13 Serbian or 
Bosnian Serb ICTY suspects were arrested and transferred to The Hague in just a 
few months which were presented to public as the key for opening up doors for 
Serbia to join the EU (Subotic, forthcoming).  
 
This new strategy however was not motivated by moral values (to achieve 
justice) but rather by pragmatic/tactical calculations such as propitiating European 
actors, avoiding from sanctions, gaining a stonger bargaining position for Kosovo 
and getting a better record from EU’s Feasbility Study. 47 As Subotic underlines; 
“The sudden change of heart and the streamlined process of “voluntary 
surrenders” was the result of larger political calculations of the Serbian 
government, which was concerned that, unless Serbia steps up its cooperation 
with the ICTY, it will not be allowed a seat at the table regarding much more 
important issues on the agenda – the status of Kosovo.”48 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
47 The Feasibility  Study is an evaluation report that establishes whether a country is able to 
negotiate an SAA 
48 Author’s Interiew with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009 
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 The Serbian government’s new strategy worked and EU approved a positive 
Feasibility Study in April assessing that although this has been slow and 
sometimes partial especially owing to the legacy of the past regime Serbia has 
made sufficient progress in meeting the prerequisites and developing the capacity 
to negotiate which in turn resulted opening up SAA negotiations in October 2005. 
49 
 
Although political elites seemed to support Serbian cooperation with the 
ICTY, they have framed cooperation in terms that resonate with Serbian 
nationalists in order to sell Europeanization and its cost to public at home 
(Orentlicher, 2008:21) They used the jargon of coooperation with ICTY and 
international justice in true nationalist style sending signals to the domestic 
audience that nothing significant would change, that the grand-narrative of 
Serbia’s victim-centered nationalist tradition would continue. Consequently this 
strategy allowed Serbia to go through the motions of formally complying with 
European institutional demands, while in fact repudiating behavioural change and 
profound social transformation Europeanization requires. A survey conducted in 
December 2004, reverberates the impact of goverment’s strategy on public 
showing that only 15 percent of those polled support cooperation with the ICTY 
in order to achieve justice while a majority support cooperation on the pragmatic 
grounds often cited by political leaders.50  
 
Since the cost of full compliance was still high, government of Kostunica 
simulated compliance to avoid the even higher costs of total refusal to and to 
update the Feasibility Study of EU and EU decision-making on the opening of 
association negotiations. Several war criminals were arrested but the actors still 
did not believe in the appropriateness of these domestic changes .Thus the second 
phase of Europeanization process in the country may be considered as 
partial/fake Europeanization and did not moved beyond political cost-benefit 
calculations as also stated by Subotic “the entire process of Europeanization in 
Serbia has been shallow or fake compliance. Serbian elites, even the reformers, 
pick and choose how they want to Europeanize. So they accept some 
requirements, but then reject the most important ones such as cooperation with 
the ICTY and recognition of Kosovo” 51 
 
         
                                                                                                                                                        
 
49 European Commission (2005) Preparedness of Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate a  
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union, [SEC (2005)478], p.4 
50 Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing Research, “Public Opinion in 
Serbia: Views on Domestic War Crimes Judicial Authorities and the Hague Tribunal,” December 
2004  (See Appendix D, Figure 4) 
51 Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009. 
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         5.3.3 Phase III (2005-2009): Positive Europeanization....But! 
 
Serbia’s strategic ‘quasi-compliance’ with EU’s principal requirement 
collapsed in 2006 when Serbia failed to transfer two remaining most wanted 
indictees – Radovan Karadžić and especially Ratko Mladić to the Hague. The EU 
squeezed on Serbia to arrest and to transfer those two men who was widely 
believed to be hiding in Serbia, protected by the Serbian military.  On May 3, 
2006, EU negotiations on Serbia’s accession were officially suspended. This 
unfavorable turn of events put great strain on Serbian government and resulted in 
stalled Europeanization. The public opinion surveys shows that Serbian public 
tended to accuse EU of slowing down the reform process and blckmailing towards 
their country.52 
 
In the next few months, however, European policies towards Serbia began to 
change. On February 12, 2007 EU announced, that SAA negotiations with Serbia 
would resume provided the government shows a clear commitment to achieve full 
cooperation with the ICTY, and takes concrete and effective action for full 
cooperation without clarifying ‘clear commitment’. In November 2007, the EU 
initialized the SAA and finally signed the agreement with Serbia on April 29, 
2008 putting Serbia on a fast track toward membership, although Serbia did not 
show any progress in cooperation with ICTY. Moreover, in January 2008, a visa 
facilitation and a readmission agreement between Serbia and the EU came into 
force which is important to “revive Euro enthusiasm in Serbia”, Subotic says. 
“Serbs don’t care much about war crimes, about their responsibility for the war. 
They want to join Europe because they understand that this will bring them 
material benefits, but not at any cost. But overall, when you look at opinion polls, 
most citizens want to join Europe for very practical reasons (to get on a Schengen 
visa list, to get access to European markets) 53and not because they feel 
European.”54 
 
The calculations behind EU’s unexpected turn reflects the intricacy of the 
EU’s strategies but a key factor was strengthening pro-European forces within 
Serbia namely reformist Democratic Party against hard line Democratic Party of 
Serbia and Serbian Radical Party for the coming parliamentary elections in May 
2008 (Orentlicher, 2008:49) The EU’s strategy may have contributed to election 
results that favored the pro-reformist and Euro-enthusiastic Democratic Party led 
by President Tadić. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
52 See Appendix D Figure 11 
53 A November 2008 public opinion survey carried out by the Centre for Free Elections and 
Democracy found that living conditions and the economy remain the most important issues for 
Serbian citizens, with EU integration (Cvijic,2009:2) (See Appendix D, Figure 12)  
54 Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009. 
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 The change of government lowered the costs of adoption, increased the level 
of domestic reonance and more importantly triggered the improvement in 
cooperation with the ICTY where the new reformist political leaders surprised 
international observers and the Hague tribunal itself by arresting Radovan 
Karadžić in Belgrade, in July 2008. This development is of major symbolic and 
political significance as an essential step in Europe’s direction (Rupnik, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 Electiosn: Pro-reformist Coalition Goverment  
 
Divisions between political parties on major policy issues adversely affected the 
activities of parliament and government, leading to early legislative elections in 2008. 
For a European Serbia is an electoral coalition that won the Serbian parliamentary 
election, 2008.  The coalition was formed by the Democratic Party led by Boris Tadić 
, G17+, Serbian Renewal Movement, League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina and 
Sanjak Democratic Party. All parties (with the arguable exception of some radical 
nationalist formations) have been committed to democratizing Serbian politics. The 
coalition formed the Government with Mirko Cvetković as a Prime Minister on July 7 
after securing the needed majority in the National Assembly with the coalition around 
the Socialist Party. 
 
The arrest of Karadžić also testifies to the effectiveness of European leverage 
since there has been an ongoing debate among Europeans about the wisdom and 
effectiveness of European conditionality with regard to cooperation with the 
International Tribunal (Rupnik, 2008). ‘We have to appreciate Serbia for the 
efforts she has made until now’ says Oli Rehn; ‘Serbia has cooperated in locating 
and handing over 20 of the 24 ICTY indictees. shows that our policy of 
conditionality works’.55 The increased level of cooperation with ICTY had also an 
educative function teaching the Serbian public about war crimes committed by 
their political leaders. This is a first step toward acknowledging Serbian 
responsibility for atrocious crimes and unequivocally condemning them 
(Orentlicher, 2008: 20) which increased the level of legitimacy of EU 
requirements. 
 
The strong external incentives were supported by favourable domestic 
conditios when the new governing coalition has placed pro-European actors in the 
divers’s seat of European politics (Spendzharova, 2003) The goverment has 
seemed to be willing and able to move on a number of important issues including 
the arrest of war-crimes indictee Karadžić, ratification of SAA with EU and 
planning to complete its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal by the end of 2009 
by handing over the remaining indictees – Ratko Mladić (and Goran Hadžic). For 
the first time since the assassination of reformist PM Djindic in 2003, Serbia 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
55 Oli Rehn, “Commission's full support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)”, European Parliament Plenary Meeting Strasbourg, 11 March 2009  
SPEECH/09/111 
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 appers to make progress towards full democratic consolidation (Edmuns, 
2009:128), and positive Europeanization due to low level of adoption costs, high 
domestic resonance and more credible EU perspective. 
 
However the process itself carries its negative seeds inside since illiberal 
resilience is rooted in Serbian political culture. Reformist elements and newly 
emerging civil society activism which is very weak therefore have had to work 
within—and often struggle against—a political space shaped by the illiberal 
practices of the past (Edmuns, 2009:139). The positie nature of Europeanization 
may turn easily into a negative one and the direction of the country can change 
since Kosovo still stands as a problem as it become clear in words of Vuk Jeremić 
-Foreign Minister of Serbia; “ The Serbian government will not recognize Kosovo 
at any cost. Not now. Not in a year. Not in a decade. Never. For Kosovo and 
Metohija shall remain a part of Serbia forever” 56 As Batt (2009:3) highlighted 
leaving Kosovo unresolved would sooner or later put obstacles in the way of 
Serbia in implementation of SAA and acquis. Cooperation with the Hague and 
Kosovo issue are keeping Serbia in the ‘trap of its unfinished past’ (Orlovic, 
2008:216). This reveals that uprooting the embedded illiberal legacies of the 
Miloševic regime and consolidating democracy where political culture is 
committed to liberal-democratic principles and rooted in active civil society, are 
likely to be a slow and far from straightforward task in Serbia.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
56Jeremić: Serbia won't recognize Kosovo, 22 April 2009 ,B92 Insight 
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 6. Does Candidate Status Matter? A 
Comparative Analysis 
Does candidate status matter? Yes it does matter!A state complies with the 
norms of the EU if the level credibility and size of external incentive is high. The 
Helsinki Summit in 1999 where Turkey gained a formal status of candidate 
country, provided a strong incentive to launch taboo-breaking democratic reforms 
for the membership. Similarly when Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 
confirmed association process, leading to the perspective of eventual EU 
membership for Serbia, the Kostunica goverment has taken crucial steps towards 
cooperation with the ICTY. It can be said that policies of conditionality lead to 
fast and radical changes in the short to medium run as in the case in Turkey and 
Serbia. However the more deep-rooted changes may only be expected in the 
longer run where civic actors and socialization process gain more importance for 
internalization of EU norms and values and, societal Europeanization. 
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Societal Europeanization  
 
It operates on a fundamental level and can be defined as a process of change in the
‘construction of systems of meanings and collective understandings’ within the
context of European integration (Cowles et al, p. 219). This implies that the EU and
Europe become reference points in the construction of social identities and alter the
way in which such identities are constructed and represented (Diez et al, 2005, p.5-6)  
 
 
The credible accession conditionality, therefore, is only a necessary but not a 
ufficient condition of EU success in promoting reform process. When the 
omplaince to EU requirements costs too much, that is when fulfilling EU 
onditions contradict the established notions of the regime and historical legacies, 
hreathen the secuirty and integrity of the state, and/or the political interests of 
overment, it becomes a challenge for political elites to continue EU-demanded 
eform process and to resist against veto players who tend to mobilize anti-EU 
endencies. Thus even credible membership/ candidacy incentives prove 
neffective to produce compliancy without being accompanied by favourable 
omestic conditions which illustrates the interplay between two levels. The 
roblem has crucial connotation of the EU’s failure to recognize the specific 
olitical circumstances of the countries which may mitigate the transformative 
ower of EU (Edmuns, 2009:140)  
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In Turkey and Serbia the Europeanization has not been a smooth and linear 
process but rather moves in a up and down/stop-and-go pattern since it meets with 
resistance in national arena. Thus the limited progress of reform and integration 
with EU has been vulnerable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
seats. 
Strong veto players... 
 
In Turkey the European integration process is paralysed when EU requirements began 
to shake main corner stones of Kemalist ideology and the very nucleus of the state 
whereas in Serbia the reform process just stalled since European demands disturbed 
ghosts of Milošević era policies. In both countries there are strong veto players within 
the state structure who have privileged positions and interest in the keeping their 
 
These cases therefore do not only demonstrate that domestic factors matter 
more than external incentives for the future trajectory of the reform process but 
also depicts the limits of conditionality in sustaining momentum for reform along 
the long and difficult road to accession. As Schimmelfennig highlights “external 
rewards can compensate for domestic costs and other inhibiting factors – but only 
to a point. In the end, domestic factors are trump.” 57  
 
The long term effectiveness of the EU’s influence and its ability to promote 
democracy also depend on regime type and party policy constellations in 
candidates (Schimmelfennig, 2007:132; Sedelmeier, 2006:15). As it has exhibited 
in the cases the parties in goverment affect the Europeanization pattern of 
countries. In the mixed party policy constellation such as in Turkey and Serbia, 
liberal and antiliberal parties or coalitions compete for political power. In these 
cases, democratic transformation has developed in a up-and-down pattern 
(ibid:134). For example in Turkish case, the first phase of the process was marked 
by fake copmlaince where MHP-DSP-ANAP coalition had illiberal tendencies 
towards reforms concerning Kurdish rights and role of military. However in the 
second phase AKP goverment adopt its policy/programme content and agenda 
that are consistent with EU requirements which in turn led to positive 
Europeanization.58 The Serbian case also proves the argument where the pro-
reformist and Euro-enthusiastic Democratic Party after 2008 elections triggered 
the reform process through improving the cooperation with the ICTY. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
57 Author’s interview with Frank Schimmelfennig, 7 May 2009. 
58 See Digdem Soyaltin “Europeanization as a path dependent process in Turkey: Changing 
positions of political parties within an unchanging European trajectory”.Paper presented at the EUI 
Tenth Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence 25-28 March 2009. The author has discussed the 
impact of transformative power of Europeanization on Turkey where EU’s leverage challenges 
traditional notions of republic and reshapes established positions of political parties 
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 I argue -and time will tell- EU’s clear membership perspective creates the 
conditions for ‘locking in’ liberal democratic changes, signals to the parties that 
compliance is “the only game in town” and triggers a process of domestic debate 
whereby parties and constituencies realise what kind of benefits that could be 
achieved by playing the “Europeanisation card”. Simultaneously, authoritarian-
nationalist parties would adapt to an EU-compatible agenda, change their rhetoric 
and outlook in favor of compliance in the long run (Vachudova, 2006:33, 
Saatçioğlu, 2007:13). Schimmelfennig also underlines that “the  lock-in effects of 
integration creates path dependency across changes in government and may, 
eventually, change the party constellations from mixed to liberal in the end.” 59 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e public. 
To sell Europenization to Public... 
 
In Turkey and Serbia, prospect of EU membership perspective has played a crucial 
role in terms of transforming all political parties by making them to adopt their 
policy/programme contents and agendas to some extent consistent with EU 
requirements. However the transformative mechanims work weakly in in thse tw 
countries since the current reformers (DS, G17 in Serbia and AKP in Turkey) are not 
liberal enough. They are certainly much better than nationalist and illiberal parties, 
but they still work within ideologically nationalist framework, especially when it 
comes to sensitive issues since it is challenging to sell Europeanization to th
 
It is clear that the EU’s transformative mechanisms in Turkey and Serbia will 
not be effective in promoting sustainable compliance without efforts of domestic 
actors to work in synergy with EU and, the consensus among the political, 
economic and social elites and the citizens as to the necessity of EU-guided 
democratisation (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 918; Vachudova, 2006: 34 Anastakis 
and Bechev, 2003: 11). In this sense the active participation of civil society actors 
is important as it sets in motion – beyond legal Europeanization– a process of 
socialization and societal Europeanization  
 
In Turkey post-Helsinki era witnessed the rise of the intense internal pressure 
from business interest NGOs, liberal civil society organizations, universities, the 
media on the government for launching reforms. The launch of reforms in 2002 
and ongoing reform process since 2008 therefore, have been partly a consequence 
of active pressure via these change agents to the government. In this sense lack of 
civil society activisim due to its communist culture, is perhaps the biggest 
problem in Serbia.60 There are no powerful civic actors to put pressure on 
goverment for triggering democratic reforms. Moreover government, media, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
59 Author’s interview with Frank Schimmelfennig, 7 May 2009 
60 Serbia’s Freedom of House rating for civil society remains at 2.75 whereas it is 4.33 in Turkey 
due recent liberal reforms which have eased restrictions on the civic associations in 2007-2008 
(see more : ) However very recently  the strong liberalizing tendencies are 
observable in civil society.  
www.freedomhouse.org
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 society remain hostile to civil society.61 As Subotic underlines “these change 
agents are still largely nationalistic, especially the media, universities, and 
politicians. NGOs and some pro-European politicians do exist, but they are very 
weak. They have no real access to political change. They are often ridiculed in the 
media, they are abused (some of these NGO and liberal politicians are often 
physically attacked). This is because it is still much safer to be a nationalist than a 
reformist in Serbia.” 62 
 
Studying compliance as such requires a thorough analysis of changing public 
stance, rival political party orientations towards EU membership and civil society 
activism in target countries as the main causal mechanism between conditionality 
and Europeanizaion which could not be fully elaborated upon here due to space 
limitations63. Such a comprehensive analysis would clearly allow us to unpack the 
puzzle of cross-national variation in Europeanization patterns. This thesis 
therefore points out new research areas for furher analysis.     
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
61 Serbia Country Report , Nations in Transit 2006, Freedom House, p.2 
62 Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009. 
63 Author aims to study during her PhD on party adaptation to EU accession as the transformation 
of political parties and the party system in Croatia, Turkey and Serbia has wider affects than the 
sphere of party politics and has a significant impact on Europeanization of politics, domestic 
political debate and public opinion about European matters in general. 
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 7. Concluding Remarks  
Europeanization is a long process. It does not come at once and does not come 
alone but rather bring challenges along with. Given the EU norm violation in 
Turkey and Serbia and the conflicts at national arena, the effectiveness of the 
incorporation of ready-made model is doubtful. In this sense this thesis attempts 
to open the black box of the domestic factors which have brought different 
dynamics to Europeanization process. Turkey and Serbia are chosen as case 
studies to point out the cultural filters which mitigate or constrain the 
transformative impact of EU and political learning in the countries leading to 
unexpected consequences such as resistance and rejection of EU norms. 
 
This thesis tested external incentives and domestic factors to examine the 
conditions under which political elites in Turkey and Serbia have complied, or 
partially complied or rejected to comply with the political demands of EU refering 
different Europeanization patterns of countries. For each country a similar basic 
template is used which begins with initial conflict and different issues of norm 
violation in target country, and continues with European demands and conditions. 
The analysis finalizes with the outcome part where the complaince patterns of 
countries are analysed in different time frames. The empirical analysis exemplify 
that the reward on the edge of the tunnel –that is the candidacy/membership 
status-does not lead to assertable compliance and a long lasting refom process 
unless the natonal features provide a fertile ground and dometic/civic actors hold a 
light in their hands in order to move on this long road. 
 
Addressing the backlashes of Europeanization strategy in both countries in 
recent years, the conditionality strategy has been ineffective to achieve 
compliance under the constraints of cultural filters. This does not only reveal the 
loopholes of Europeanization which European actors must take into account of,  
but also pinpoints the importance socialization as an indirect influence mechanism 
in order to assure sustainable compliance, to promote norm diffusion and to avoid 
from ‘shallow, fake, partial or negative Europeanization.’ Moreover, the role of 
change agents converged on a pro-EU agenda resisting against the power of veto 
players should also be taken into account since they apparently push goverments 
towards a reformist trajectory. The active participation of these actors is important 
as it paves the way for a process of socialization, a societal and a ‘genuine 
Europeanization.’ A collaboration between political elites, civic actors and public 
both at national and European level is the key for the success of eventual 
Europeanization. 
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 8. Executive Summary 
Europeanization has been recently emerging as crucial instrument and 
mechanism for top-down democratisation process of countries in the enlargement 
track. Conditionality is a concept that is placed very much at the centre of the 
Europeanization which is based on rule transfer and generally works through 
reinforcement by reward where membership is the greatest reward to be offered. 
However current disappointments of Europeanization in several countries put the 
effectiveness of reinforcement by reward strategy in question. 
 
This thesis seeks to answer a highly related question to this debate question of 
if candidate status matters – and to what extent it matters for two countries-
Turkey and Serbia. The first part of the question addresses the impact of external 
incentives- namely size and credibility of EU rewards- on compliance patterns of 
countries with EU demands and attempts to demonstrate how important the credible 
prospect of EU membership is, in this sense. The second part of the question is related 
to impact of domestic characteristcis which carry different dynamics to 
Europeanization process. In this sense it is argued that the transaformative power 
of EU is filtered by domestic factors that are incompatible with European values, 
norms and ruıles. 
 
The thesis focuses on the hypothesis that it is less the candidate status per se 
that matters but rather the unfavourable domestic factors, high costs of 
compliance, existence of robust veto players and the failure of the countries to 
include the civil society actors in their transformation process that account for the 
limited impact of transformative power of EU through conditionality and for low 
level of compliance. 
 
The case selection demonstrate the loopholes in Europeanization process in 
which conditionality turns out to be weak to promote compliance when EU’s 
demands meet with resistance at national arena. The Europeanization process in 
Turkey and Serbia where the accession negotiations with the former were partially 
suspended in 2006 and the association negotiations with the latter has fallen into 
abeyance between May 2006 and June 2007 is paralysed due to high costs of 
complaince to EU requirements. In particular in both countries fulfilling EU 
conditions has become a a challenge for traditional notions of the regime, for the 
secuirty and integrity of the state, and/or the interests of goverment. Thus it has 
been difficult for government and political elites too attach to ultimate goal of EU 
membership and to resist against veto players who benefit from mobilizing anti-
EU tendencies through linking national problem and EU membership process. 
 
 66
 The conflicts at national arena point out that EU conditionality can have 
important catalytic role in prompting reforms, a sustainable reform process 
however requires certain domestic conditions to prevail which in turn exhibits the 
the impact of interaction between external incentives and domestic conditions on 
Europeanization patterns of countries (Putnam’s two level game). 
 
The thesis is mainly divided in seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory 
part which begins with clarfying research question(s), main argument and 
hypotheses, and continues with research design, case selection, metholodological 
considerations and finalizes with an overview of the existing literature and the 
structure of the thesis. Next chapter (Chapter 2) draws a framework for 
Europeanization where a comprehensive conceptualisation and a theoretical 
background are presented. This thesis has a post-ontological approach towards 
Europeanization which brings domestic politics back into our understanding of 
European integration through focusing on the impact of EU on domestic political 
and societal processes. I understand Europeanization as a process includes both 
hard transfer of rules, procedures and policy paradigms but also soft transfer of 
styles, ways of doing things, shared beliefs, norms and discourses since formal 
rule transfer also has a normative transformative impact on ideological structures 
and preferences of the target states.  
 
After outlining the Europeanization conceptual delimitations, the thesis turns 
to theorizing Europeanization process through elaborating its main areas of 
influence, scope and mechanisms. It is important to demonstrate the domains of 
Europeanization to clarify the wide range of EU influence on target countries. It is 
actually not only about legal engineering through adoption of EU rules but also 
about change of ways of doing things, norms and collective understandings. The 
scope of domestic change in response to EU’s transformative power is related to 
how much change’ has been brought about by Europeanization which can range 
from more or less domestic change to large scale transformation. 
 
Within the framework of this thesis I follow Schimmelfenning et al’s 
approach and employ two basic models for European governance and rule 
promotion–external incentives and social learning to understand the motives 
behind the compliance decisions of target states. External incentives model is  
based on cost-benefit balance which depends on the size and credibility of 
international rewards, on the one hand, and the size of domestic adoption costs, on 
the other. Social learning model whereas emphasizes on degree of cultural match 
between EU norms and domestic practices. 
 
Chapter 3 illuminates the main hypotheses of the external incentives and 
social learning model and describes the independent and dependent variables. The 
independent variables which have impact on complaince to EU requirements (as 
dependent variable) are subdivided into external and domestic conditions and put 
in a table to model Europeanization patterns of the countries. The external 
conditions refer to attribute of EU’s strategies (size and credibility of rewards and 
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 legitimay); whereas domestic conditions attributes of target goverments (costs, 
veto players idenitifaction, resonance).  
 
Four different Europeanization outcomes are formulated by using different 
combinations of external and domestic conditions: positive, slowed, fake and 
stalled Europeanization. Europeanization is likely to be positive if endogenous 
factors are favourable and external incentive is strong where the level of 
compliance to EU requirements is on its highest level. The reform process led by 
Europeanization loses its momentum but still contiunes on a lower rank due to 
power of favuroable domestic factors and /or demand of change agents who put 
pressure on governent for further reforms although external incentive is weak. 
 
Fake/partial Europeanization refers simulating compliance to avoid the even 
higher costs of confrontation, total refusal to comply and denial of a membership 
prospect if domestic factors are unfavourable. However the outcome can be worse  
when unfavourable domestic conditions are worsened by weak external incentive 
resulting in stalled Europeanization where the reform process paralysed and faced 
with a rupture. 
 
Chapter 4 and 5 follow the same template which begins with initial conflict 
and different issues of norm violation in target country, and continues with 
European demands and conditions and finalizes with the outcome part where the 
complaince patterns of countries are analysed in different time frames. These time 
frames are formulated following critical junctures and ups and downs in 
countries’ Europeanization processes. This template is used for both Turkey and 
Serbia for the empirical analysis.  
 
The core of the emprical research consists the analysis of official documents 
of EU which follows the progress made by target countries in order to fulfill the 
EU demands and daily news which allows me to track the conditions of EU and 
compliance/non-compliance patterns of target goverments. In addition to primary 
(official documents, speeches, press releases etc.) sources, the analysis counts on 
the rich collection of secondary sources (academic literature). Furthermore several 
semi-standardized expert interviews with scholars working on Europeanization in 
South Eastern Europe (specifically on Turkey and in Serbia) are also conducted to 
acquire a more structured insight on the issue.64  
 
Within the framework of the Turkish case (Chapter 4) Kurdish question, 
insufficient democratic-civilian control of military and Cyprus problem are taken 
as examples illustrating contradictory nature of Turkish policy practises and its 
Kemalist ideology for EU’s notions of liberal democracy. The case study covers 
Turkey’s Europeaanization process which begins with when Turkey was given 
candidate status in 1999 and is subdivied in three phases (1999-2002/ 2002-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
64  See Appendix B -List of Interviewees  
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 2005/post-2005). In case of Serbia (Chapter 5), co-operation with the ICTY to 
capture and extradite suspected war criminals and recognition of Kosovo are 
chosen since they became challenging for national identity and historical legacies. 
The case of Serbia covers country’s Europeaanization process since Serbia went 
through a democratic transition, overthrowing regime of Milošević n October 
2000 and is subdivied in three phases (2000-2003/2003-2005/2005-2008) 
 
 Chapter 6 attempts to reply the pre-asked research question of this thesis 
(Does candidate status matter?) in the light of the empirical findings. The 
comparative analysis of the cases demonstreates that the credible accession 
conditionality  is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of EU success in 
promoting reform process. It should be supplemented with a fertile domestic 
environment which illustrates the interplay between two levels. Furthermore long 
term effectiveness of the process also depends on party policy constellations and 
active participation of civil society actors to the process which are negleted 
factors. The conclusionary findings of this thesis therefore mark new avenues for 
future research. 
 
The EU membership perspective has played a key role in terms of 
transforming political parties even the authoritarian-nationalist ones by making 
them to adopt their policy/programme contents and agendas to some extent 
consistent with EU requirements. It also creates the conditions for ‘locking in’ 
liberal democratic changes in which goverments are locked in to a predictable 
policy making. DS, G17 in Serbia and AKP in Turkey reveal evidence of impact f 
Europeanization. However without the consensus among the political, economic 
and social elites and the citizens as to the necessity of EU-guided democratisation, 
the eventual success of Europeanization is doubtful. Within this regard, the civil 
society activitism is important as it puts an addtitional pressure on goverment 
besides EU leverage for further deomctratic reforms.  
 
The ‘pincer’ in which external and internal actors have formed an alliance to 
put top-down and bottom-up pressure on the target government to make liberal 
and democratic reforms is the key factor for a societal and a geniune 
Europeanization. The last chapter (Chapter7) introduces a more general epilogue 
about the relationship between EU conditionality and Europeanization where 
Brussels must take into account of the cultural filters of the countries and 
loopholes in the Europeanization process and acknowledge that Europeanization 
is not a common panacea for all countries but domestic factors matter! 
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 10. Appendices 
10. 1 Appendix A- Freedoms House's Guidelines and Ratings                                                                   
 
Freedom House provided guidelines for ratings and a checklist of questions covering seven categories: electoral process; civil society; 
independent media; national democratic governance; local democratic governance; judicial framework and independence (formerly 
constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework); and corruption. Which can be summarised under two broad categories: political rights and 
civil liberties The political rights and civil liberties categories contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country or territory. For 
reading its democracy scorecard, it offers the guide. 
 
 
 
 
The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House. The democracy score is an average of ratings for political rights and civil liberties scores 
where ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score 
is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. 
 I
  
 
Democracy score Turkey  Serbia 
2002 4.50 3.0 
2003 3.50 2.50 
2004 3.50 2.50 
2005 3.50 2.50 
2006 3.0 2.50 
2007 3.0 2.50 
2008 3.0 2.50 
Democracy Score -Average of Freedom House Ratings 
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*created by the Author 
In the Graph above the Y-axis shows the average democracy score ranking between 1 and 7. 
CJ: Critical Junctures where negotiations were opened with EU and then were partly frozen (for Turkey 2005/2006, for Serbia 2005/2007)  
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 10.2 Appendix B-List of Inte
 
 
 
MSc. Thesis  
Does candidate status matte
“Unpacking the relationship between of Eur
the Conditionality in Turkey and 
Digdem Soyaltin, MSc. 
Lund University 
List Of Interviewees 
 
1. Professor Frank Schimmelfennig, ETH Züric
Switzerland (skype interview, 7 May 2009 ) 
 
2 Professor Geoffrey Pridham, European Politics
UK; and currently ESRC (Economic and Social R
(e-mail interview, 2 April 2009)  
 
3. Dr. Jelena Subotic- Assistant Professor of Politic
State University in Atlanta. (Skype interview, 13 Ma
 
4. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Lecturer at the Depa
Modern Asian Studies, University of Athens a
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Pol
to face interview, 27March 2009 –Florence-) 
 
 
 rviewees and Interview Guide 
 
Didem: Q1.The external incentive model of Schimmelfennig (2006) is proved to be 
highly effective in locking in democratic reforms in unstable democratic 
countries.So although the powerful veto players and institutional structures 
embedded in the domestic sociopolitical context may obstruct reforms, the EU’s 
leverage helps explain why this failured countries can succeed in breaking the 
vicious circle and in ultimately qualifying for EU membership. The EU 
conditionality tiltles the political balance in favour of a consensus on pro-EU 
reforms. Can this model work to change Serbia/Turkey’s stalled Europeanization 
process? If not why? 
Interviewee: 
Didem: Q2.Jelena Subotic present three alternative arguments for EU’s low impact 
in difficult states: weak domestic demand for Europeanization, veto players 
institutionalized in democratic structures, and competing elite strategies. Do you 
think that this model can be tested for Turkey where adoption of the political aspects 
of Copenhagen criteria became a challenge for its state ideology -Kemalism-, its 
unitary understanding of national identity and minorities and traditionally defined 
role of military in politics? 
Interviewee: 
Didem:Q3- Gergana Noutcheva (2006)  argues when the cost of  full compliance is 
very  high in short term and the degree of legitimacy of EU conditions is low, 
political actors can simulate compliance (fake compliance)  to avoid the even higher 
costs of blatant confrontation, total refusal to comply and denial of a membership 
prospect. Socialization activities under these circumstances are not sufficient to 
convince actors in the “appropriateness” of EU-demanded institutional and policy 
change. In practical terms, the difference between genuine and fake compliance can 
be registered by looking at implementation. If domestic actors pass legislation 
compliant with EU-demands but legal enforcement does not follow up, the ensuing 
conclusion is that there is no political will to do the reforms requested. Hence, the 
actors do not believe in the appropriateness of these domestic changes. Is it true to 
say that the limited compliance to EU requirements in Serbia/Turkey can be an 
example of fake compliance?  
Interviewee:
r? 
opeanization and 
Serbia” 
h, European Politics, 
 at Bristol University, 
esearch Council, UK) 
al Science at Georgia 
rch 2009 ) 
rtment of Turkish and 
nd Research Fellow, 
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III
  IV
 
 
Didem: Q8-Looking at the results of public opinion polls in Serbia leads to the 
conclusion that while Milosevic’s Serbia during the 1990s kept distancing itself 
from Europe, the post-Milosevic´ Serbia after 2000 sees  the return to Europe as 
the only alternative (3/4 of citizens) So are closer partnership with Russia and third 
way of neutrality real alternatives for Serbia? Can  lack of any alternative other 
than EU promote EU forms in Serbia?  
Interviewee: 
Didem: Q9-Is there a way to change negative narrative or arrogant image of EU in 
eyes of Serbs? Can pro-EU media, change agents, business communities, interest 
groups play a role in changing Serbia’s policy towards EU? Are civil society 
organizations, business communities, and interest groups etc powerful enough to 
put pressure on goverment to trigger EU reforms? Isn’t it more benefical (benefits 
exceeds costs) for these actors to be on EU track rather than to be caught in the 
‘trap of an unfinished past? 
Interviewee: 
Didem: Q10- Political parties in Serbia/Turkey reveal evidence of 
Europeanization in adapting their programmes and organization, as well as in 
imposing European themes in electoral campaigns. Do you believe that increased 
participation in European structures would have some socializing effects on 
Serbian/Turkish parties resulting in incorporation of EU rules, norms, values and 
practises and in a more pro-EU policy in the country? 
Interviewee: 
Didem: Q11.-The  unavoidable political hallmark of Serbia is its central position 
in the Balkans, the crossing point of civilizations and their influences, as well as 
the hyper production of history and therefore an obsession with the past instead of 
the future. The strong influence of the authoritarian heritage impacts on the present 
day, leading to a large extent towards Euroscepticism.How do you define Euro-
sceptism in Serbia? Is it totaly against EU membership and entire project of 
European integration or only against the implementation of EU requirements on 
the grounds that such reforms would undermine traditional legacies, historical 
heritage and national interests which it the case in Turkey? (Refering to discussion 
about hard/soft Eurosceptism, Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2001)  
Interviewee: 
 
Didem: Q4-Referring to Noutcheva’s model even if benefits are higher than costs 
for the EU-demanded reforms, domestic actors resist to compliance since they do 
not find the normative power of EU arguments persuasive (legitimacy is low).The 
only way in Noutcheva’s model to promote compliance is then to use 
conditionality. But high pressure can also lead resistance as we have seen in 
Serbia. From this perspective can we say that low level of perceived legitimacy of 
EU makes more sense for Serbian/Turkish elites’ motives for their 
(non)compliance decisions than cost /benefits balance of EU membership? 
Interviewee:  
Didem: Q5-What is your impression about the Serbia’s future position towards 
independent Kosovo? What is the price of recognizing Kosovo? Is it more 
expensive then being excluded from EU membership when other Balkan countries 
are on the EU track? Can you make a comparison of Serbia’s policy towards 
Kosovo with Turkey’s policy towards Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? Are 
both indispensable national interests and part of old regimes’s legacies that both 
countries can not give up? 
Interviewee: 
Didem: Q6- EU announced in February 2007 that SAA negotiations with Serbia 
would start despite of Serbia’s continuing failure to deliver the two major 
suspects- Mladic and Karadzic. Do you think it will help EU and pro-reformist 
actors in Serbia to pressure the Serbian government to recognize Kosovo? Or if 
EU would go one step further and offer to Serbia the candidate status, does it 
matter for Serbia and Serbia’s policy for Kosovo? In my thesis I argue that it is 
less the candidate status (size and credibility of rewards) per se that matters but 
rather the incompatible domestic factors and high costs of compliance that account 
for the limited impact of transformative power of EU through conditionality and 
for low level of compliance.Do you think this is the case for Serbia ? 
 
Didem: Q7-The level of support for EU membership especially within young 
people is not too low in Serbia. But the Serbian elites –media, Church, 
intellectuals- are reluctant to Europeanize.In Turkey there is strong elite support. 
How do you define role of elite support/lack of elite support for Europenization 
process of countries? 
Interviewee: 
 
 
 
 
  V
 
 
Didem: Q12- If compliance to European values, norms and rules is not the case, 
embership perspective became more clear the (pro)-
under which conditions this issue moves from the political fringe to become a 
central cleavage of national party politics? National cultural legacies and domestic 
factors delimiting the norm diffusion, can give a reason for the non-compliance? 
What are the factors and mechanisms then,  to achieve sustainable compliance and 
to promote norm diffusion? 
Interviewee: 
- Since the mDidem: Q13
European mood of Serbian/Turkish public opinion has advanced. But an anomaly is 
present. Although a majority of citizens support entry to the EU, a significantly 
smaller number supports the extradition of those indicted for war crimes in Serbia 
and recognition of RoC even though they are conditions for negotiations on the 
Association/membership Agreement. How do you explain this anomaly? What 
does  being a EU member mean for Serbian/Turkish people? 
Interviewee: 
- The painful and costly transformaDidem :Q14 tion in pre-accession period, 
ova (2006) in her article (Democratization in Postcommunist 
therefore provides greatest opportunities for anti-EU forces and creates a vacuum 
which extreme rightist or leftist parties benefit by adopting anti-EU position.Thus 
opposition to EU membership is not always ideological but political which is based 
on popular moves and electoral calculations of the country’s political parties and 
their leaders.Can we say that this is the case for Serbia/Turkey? If so, the anti-EU 
groups can change their positions when benefits exceeds costs of compliance with 
EU requirements and being against EU membership becomes costly in terms of 
vote seeking and coalition building, so the whole picture can change in 
Serbia/Turkey in future.Is it true? What do you think about Serbia/Turkey’s EU 
policy in long term? 
Interviewee: 
 VachudDidem: Q15-
Europe: illiberal Regimes and the Leverage of International Actors) focuses on the 
sources of political change in previously illiberal regimes before and after 
‘watershed elections,’ especially in the Western Balkans. She argues that over time 
the EU’s leverage strengthened the hand of liberal forces against illiberal ones by 
way of four mechanisms: creating a focal point for cooperation, providing 
incentives for adapting, using conditionality, and serving as a credible commitment 
for reform. Consequently, most political parties have eventually changed their 
agenda to make it compatible with the state’s bid for EU membership.  
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 10.3 Appendix C-Boxes 
 
Box-1 Europeanization 
 
Europeanization is defined in different ways with several scolars.Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso 
define Europeanisation as the emergence and development of distinct structures of governance at the European level 
[Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso (eds), Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 1]. Robert Ladrech understands Europeanisation as an “incremental process reorienting 
the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational 
logic of national politics and policy-making” [Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Democratic Politics and Institutions: 
The Case of France”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1994, p. 70]. Johan P. Olsen differentiates 
between five possible meanings of Europeanisation. According to him, Europeanisation may refer to changes in the external 
territorial boundaries of the EU, to the development of institutions of governance at EU level, to central penetration of 
national and sub-national systems of governance, to the export of forms of distinctively European political organisation and 
governance beyond the territory of the EU, and to a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger EU [Johan 
P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, ARENA Working Papers, 2002, WP 01/2. Claudio M. Radaelli defines 
Europeanisation as a process of “(a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures and public policies” [Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy”, in K. Featherstone and C. 
Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 30]. Most studies of 
Europeanisation have an explicit emphasis on the EU policy process and limit Europeanisation effects to the EU member 
states. Olsen suggests a possible transfer of EU rules, procedures and paradigms to third countries, but it is Heather Grabbe 
who offers a systematic analysis of the EU’s impact on the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the 
context of the EU accession process [Heather Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU 
Accession Process”, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003, pp. 309-310]. 
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Box-3 Islamization of the state 
 
There are discussions about AKP’s real agenda behind the European curtain-Islamization of state. AKP’s recent statements 
and activities led to harsh Islamists-Kemalists confrontation over secularism. More precisely alcohol ban, criminalizing 
adultery, introducing Helal labeling on food products, separation of men and women in public spaces increasing number of 
proportion of those women wearing the Islamic headscarf have given rise to discussions about rising conservatism in Turkey, 
AKP’s limits as an Islamist conservative party to carry out the Europeanisation agenda and strengthen Kemalists’ hands in 
their arguments about the AKP’s hidden project (Öniş, 2009:46, Cornell, 2008:3). The discussions heated by AKP’s 
enthusiastic attempts for promotion of religious freedoms allowing female students to enter schools and universities with their 
headscarves escalating polarization of the existing cleavage in Turkey between the moderate Islamist government and the 
secularist establishment. However the main break occured by AKP’s announcement of its candidate for the presidential 
election as Abdullah Gül whose wife has a headscarf. 
 
This move was criticized by the Kemalist elites as endangering Turkey’s secularist state. In the eyes of Kemalists, AKP `s pro-
European standing point is just a smokescreen to hide its hidden Islamist agenda and its domestic legitimacy deficit. 
Accordingly AKP is using the European card in order to secure its political position against the secularist ideology of the 
republican state elites, to extend scope of freedom of religious, to circumscribe the military and undercut secularism (Gylptis, 
2005:413) 
Box 2 Failure in Compliance 
 
Three main strands of thought from political economy literature dominate the debate on policy reform failure and the factors 
that explain the causes of failure in compliance The interest group strand-based of classic ideas of Mancur Olson- predicts 
failure when the benefits or reform are spread across citizens whereas the costs are expected to be incurred by a much smaller 
group which can effectively organize to influence or capture the state apparatus.The J-curve hypothesis developed by Adam 
Przeworski predicts failure when short term costs of reform are so great as to create a majority of voters opposing it.Finally 
most recent trends in institutional models of politics have focused on the role of veto players in the political process as a 
critical factor in policy reform as mentioned by Tsebelis. Although these theories are not directly pertinent to (non-) 
compliance with EU political criteria their basic insights democratic politics are transferable to the situations where costs and 
benefits are more symbolic and not all entirely monetary in nature. 
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Box 4  Reforms undertaken on the Kurdish issue 
 
• The constitutional amendments of October 2001 removed the restriction on the use of any 
language prohibited by law in the expression and dissemination of thought from Art. 26 of the constitution
language on broadcasting was also removed from Art. 28. 
• Broadcasting in Kurdish was permitted with the third democratisation package in August 2002.  
The seventh package adopted in July 2003 further amended the broadcasting  
law to provide for such broadcasting by public and private radio and television stations. 
• The law that deals with the teaching of foreign languages was also amended with the  
third package in August 2002, opening the way for private courses in Kurdish.  
The seventh package adopted in July 2003 allowed the teaching of such languages in  
existing private courses without requiring that new courses be created altogether. It also prescribed  
that the Council of Ministers alone would regulate and decide which languages are to be taught (without ha
approval of the National Security Council). 
• The Civil Registry Law was amended in July 2003 to permit parents to name their children in  
Kurdish. 
• In an attempt to foster social peace in the region, parliament adopted a law on ‘social reinsertion’ 
 in August 2003. The law provides for a partial amnesty and reduction in sentences for persons involved in
activities of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK. The law excludes the leaders of  
the organisation as 
well as those who have committed crimes. By December 2003, 524 prisoners out of 2067  
applications had been released and about 586 PKK militants have surrendered. 
• Implementation of the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project”  
(where the aim is to support the return 
of those displaced during the conflict to their villages) has continued. According to official sources, 124,21
authorised to return to their villages from June 2000 to May 2004.  
More than 400 villages and hamlets have reportedly been reopened with government assistance. 
(Aydın and Keyman, 2004: 35) 
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Box 5  Reforms undertaken to decrease the influence of the military in politics 
 
 
National Security Council 
• With the October 2001 constitutional amendments, the ‘advisory’ nature of the NSC was enshrined in the constitution and the 
number of civilians in the NSC was increased. 
• With the July 2003 (sixth) harmonisation package, the representative of the NSC on the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video 
and Music was removed. 
• With the August 2003 (seventh) harmonisation package, the extended executive and supervisory powers of the secretary-
general of the NSC were abolished and other provisions authorising unlimited access of the NSC to any civilian agency were 
abrogated. The post of secretary-general was no longer confined to a military person and a civilian could be appointed upon the 
proposal of the prime minister. The frequency of NSC meetings was modified  to convene every two months instead of once a 
month. With this package, the provision to obtain the views of the NSC when determining 
the languages to be taught in Turkey was also abrogated. 
• With the May 2004 constitutional amendments, the military representative in the Higher Education Council (YÖK) wa
removed. 
• The eighth harmonisation package repealed the provision allowing for the nomination of a member of the High Audio-Visua
Board (RTÜK) by the Secretariat General of the NSC. 
Defence expenditures 
• With the August 2003 (seventh) package and the May 2004 constitutional amendments, new provisions have been adopted with
a view to enhancing the transparency of defence expenditures. The seventh package allows the Court of Auditors, upon request 
of parliament, to audit accounts and transactions of all types of organisations including those concerning the state properties 
owned by the armed forces. The May 2004 constitutional amendments removed the items exempt from auditing under the 
secrecy clause. 
005,• The Public Finance Ruling and Controlling Law adopted on 10 December 2003, which will enter into force in 1 January 2
 brings extra-budgetary funds into the overall state budget The law requires more detailed information and documents to be 
provided in the budget proposals to be submitted to the parliamentary committees and parliament.  It also requires longer periods
of debate on the defence budget proposals. 
• The Public Finance Ruling and Controlling Law establishes a method of budgeting based on performance, by requiring 
performance reports to be submitted to the parliament and related institutions, enhancing parliamentary control on military 
the Court of Auditors to undertake ‘value for- money’ inquiries and improves the  spending. The law also enables 
. mechanisms of internal control
(Aydın and Keyman, 2004:20) 
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Box 6 Cyprus Conflict and Annan Plan for Settlement of the Dispute 
 
Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960 in a power-sharing deal between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot 
minority. In 1963, three years after the establishment of the Republic, large-scale violence broke out and de facto collapsed. A buffer zone 
marked by “the green line” was drawn between the opposing groups, and in 1964. A U.N. peacekeeping force was sent in after collapse of 
the country.. The crisis intensified following the 1967 military coup in Greece, and in particular in July 1974, when the Greek Cypriot 
National Guard staged a coup to extend its dictatorship to Cyprus. Invoking its rights under the Treaty ofGuarantee, Turkey intervened 
militarily and extended its control to 37 per cent of the island’s territory in the north. 
 
The 1975 Vienna accords on exchange of populations led to the displacement of Greek Cypriots from the north and Turkish Cypriots from 
the south. The island was de facto partitioned into two zones – the Turkish Cypriot in the north and Greek Cypriot in the south – and the 
1960 constitutional order was not restored. In 1975 the Turkish Cypriots in the north constituted the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”, 
and then in 1983 declared independence as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), not recognised by the international 
community,10 with the sole exception of Turkey. In the south, the Greek Cypriots retained the title of “Republic of Cyprus”, viewed by 
the international community, with the exception of Turkey, as the only legitimate authority on the island despite the absence of Turkish 
Cypriots in state institutions.The decades that followed witnessed a consolidation of the conflict, notwithstanding the efforts of the United 
Nations, supported in the last years also by the European Union. The Helsinki Summit of 1999 constituted a break for the Cyprus conflict 
since it provided a clear linkage between the progress of the quality/nature of Turkey–EU relations and the resolution of the conflict 
together with the rest of Turkey’s problems with her neighbours. 
 
In the period 2002-04 the UN led the negotiations on the conflict under the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ The Plan provided for the 
establishment of a single United Cyprus Republic, constituted by a federal level and two constituent states (a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish 
Cypriot state). The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented five successive revisions of the Plan since November 2002, the last of 
which was submitted to separate referendums on 24 April 2004. The Plan provided for the establishment of a single United Cyprus 
Republic, constituted by a federal level and two constituent states (a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot state). In February 2004, 
Papadopoulos and Denktaş accepted Kofi Annan's invitation to resume negotiations on a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan. After 
meeting with Annan in New York, talks began on-island on 19 February 2004. The two major communities of the island held a 
referendum on settling the Cyprus dispute on 24 April 2004.  The result was surprising. The Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Plan 
with a 64.9 per cent majority and the Greek Cypriots rejected it with an emphatic 75.8 per cent majority. Then on 1May 2004 the Greek 
Cypriots chose to become an EU member, representing the whole island. (Baracani, 2007; Ulusoy,2008) 
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Figure 1 *                                                                                          Figure 2* 
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 * Translated in English by the Author 
Eurobarometer, National Report Turkey Spring 2007, p.14 
* Translated in English by the Author 
Eurobarometer, National Report Turkey Fall 2088, p.20  
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Figure 3                                                                                   Figure 4  
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   *created by the Author     
    Eurobarometer Public Survey, National reports for Turkey 
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Figure 5                                                                                       Figure 6 
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Figure 7                                                                    Figure 8 
                                                                                                                   
          Polling Data-How would you vote in referandum n Serbia’s accession to EU? 
 
 
 
 
 
In favour  61%  
Against  13%  
Would not 
vote  16%  
Not sure  10%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Source: Strategic Marketing & Media Research Institute  
              Methodology: Interviews with 1,024 Serb adults, conducted  
              From Dec. 11 to Dec. 17, 2008. Margin of error is 3 per cent.  
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If the referendum were held tomorrow with the following question: “Do you 
support the accession of our country to the EU?”  - how would you vote? 
The EU does not 
impose conditions, 
but merely requires 
that Serbia fulfills 
what was agreed
28%
Does not know - 
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opinion
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conditions for 
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